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Reaffirming the Role of the Federal Courts:
How the Sixties Provide
Guidance for Immigration Reform
Robbie Clarke∗

Immigration policy should be generous; it should be fair; it should be
flexible. With such a policy we can turn to the world, and to our own
past, with clean hands and a clean conscience. Such a policy would be
but a reaffirmation of old principles.
1

John F. Kennedy, A Nation of Immigrants (1964)
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Introduction
In 2009, fifty-eight percent of the United States judged immigration to
be "a good thing for this country today."2 At the same time, half of the
country believed that immigration rates should decrease.3 In 2007, seventyeight percent of the nation would allow for some type of a path to
citizenship for undocumented immigrants.4 The same year, "Americans
believe[d] that immigrants have tended to make crime, the economy, social
and moral values, and job opportunities worse rather than better."5 These
numbers characterize the classic ambivalence that has long defined U.S.
immigration policy and which paralyze efforts at immigration reform
today.6 Caught between being the fabled "nation of immigrants" and a
2. Lymari Morales, Americans Return to Tougher Immigration Stance, GALLUP, Aug.
5, 2009, http://www.gallup.com/poll/122057/Americans-Return-Tougher-ImmigrationStance.aspx (last visited Mar. 17, 2010) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of
Civil Rights and Social Justice).
3. Id.
4. Jeffrey M. Jones, Fewer Americans Favor Cutting Back Immigration, GALLUP,
July 10, 2008, http://www.gallup.com/poll/108748/fewer-americans-favor-cutting-backimmigration.aspx (last visited Mar. 17, 2010) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal
of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
5. Id.
6. See MICHAEL C. LEMAY, U.S. Immigration Policy and Politics, in THE
GATEKEEPERS: COMPARATIVE IMMIGRATION POLICY 1–2 (Michael LeMay ed., 1989)
[hereinafter LEMAY, GATEKEEPERS] (portraying U.S. immigration policy as perpetually
being caught between the opposing notions of immigrants as refreshing the national
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highly developed and established nation, finding the middle ground has
long proven challenging.7
Yet Congress managed to do so over half a century ago when it unified
the immigration system with the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
(INA),8 and then cleansed it of racial prejudice with the Immigration Act of
1965 (1965 Amendments),9 creating the groundwork for our modern
immigration structure.10 Following decades of racially-based immigration
policy, the 1965 Amendments launched a new era of immigration in the
United States, imbuing the immigration process with emerging nonracial
norms.11 Coupled with legislation from 1961 that standardized judicial
review of immigration hearings, the U.S. adopted a decidedly proimmigration stance. The social and political transformations of the 1960s
served as the backdrop for Congress’s actions, and many of these centered
on newly-championed individual liberties and the government’s role in
guaranteeing these rights.12 In corresponding form, the 1961 and 1965
Amendments brought U.S. immigration policy closer to the traditional
values so central to that decade which epitomize the relationship between
individuals and government.
workforce and culture against immigrants as weakening the American economy and set of
values).
7. See
HELENE
HAYES,
U.S.
IMMIGRATION
POLICY
AND
THE
UNDOCUMENTED: AMBIVALENT LAWS, FURTIVE LIVES 9 (2001) ("More than any other
dynamic, the story of immigration policy in the United States is a tale of ambivalence
towards new arrivals."). The author credits three factors for the nation’s current reservations
about
immigration: "America’s
‘exclusionary
impulse’
towards
nonwhite
immigrants . . . competing and conflicting claims of capital and labor market
interests . . . [and] the paradox embodied in undocumented immigration whereby it is
denounced on the one hand as a calamity and on the other hand has been permitted to
continue." Id.
8. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
9. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965).
10. See JAMES G. GIMPEL & JAMES R. EDWARDS, JR., THE CONGRESSIONAL POLITICS OF
IMMIGRATION REFORM 60 (1999) ("The Immigration and Nationality Act . . . remains the
foundation of U.S. immigration law, although it has subsequently been amended numerous
times. Among the most far-reaching of those amendments, the 1965 Immigration Act,
marked a sea change in U.S. immigration policy.").
11. See KEVIN R. JOHNSON, THE "HUDDLED MASSES" MYTH: IMMIGRATION AND CIVIL
RIGHTS 2 (2004) [hereinafter JOHNSON, MYTH] (declaring that "Congress eliminated racial
exclusions from the U.S. immigration laws in the heyday of the 1960s civil rights
movement" and significantly changed the racial makeup of the immigrant population).
12. See DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 225 (2007) (describing the 1965 Amendments as a "dramatic centerpiece of the
civil rights initiatives of the Johnson administration").
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However, as other legal developments from that era generally settled
into familiar positions, immigration policy has remained uncertain.13 The
changes to immigration law that took place during the 1960s, while
establishing a basic structure for the immigration system, were followed by
decades of subsequent legislation that reworked the components of that
structure.14 From a contemporary perspective, the modifications can largely
be described as an emphasis on enforcement measures and a reduction of
judicial review.15
Despite these unending attempts at constructive
immigration reform, the public continues its appeals for thorough reform.16
Nevertheless, such legislation has been elusive.17 This Note argues that the
obstacle to meaningful reform is the narrow focus of Congress. Assessing
immigration policy strictly within the confines of the nation’s current
circumstances will not provide a thorough understanding of our
immigration system or how best to reform it.18 Instead, Congress should
13. See JOHNSON, MYTH, supra note 11, at 3 (noting that efforts of racial integration,
while not fully completed, became "a legally sanctioned and socially acceptable goal").
More generally, following the progressive era of the 1960s, "not only legal but political
constraints moderate the majority’s treatment of domestic minorities." Id. at 5 (emphasis
added).
14. See infra, note 15 (explaining the types of changes made to the original
immigration system).
15. See MICHAEL C. LEMAY, ANATOMY OF A PUBLIC POLICY: THE REFORM OF
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAW 14–27, 51 (1994) [hereinafter LEMAY,
ANATOMY] (explaining that the rise of the noncitizen population of the 1970s led to passage
of mildly restrictionist legislation in the 1980s); KEVIN R. JOHNSON, OPENING THE
FLOODGATES: WHY AMERICA NEEDS TO RETHINK ITS BORDERS AND IMMIGRATION LAWS 48–
49 (2007) [hereinafter JOHNSON, FLOODGATES] (describing the increased immigration
enforcement efforts of the 1990s through border controls and tighter legislation);
KANSTROOM, supra note 12, at 229–30 (discussing the legislation of the last twenty years
which limits the involvement of federal courts in immigration adjudication).
16. See LEMAY, ANATOMY, supra note 15, at 25–27 (observing the increased rates of
public discontent with immigration policy and ensuing calls for reform during the 1970s and
1980s); ROGER DANIELS, GUARDING THE GOLDEN DOOR: AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY
AND IMMIGRANTS SINCE 1882 220 (2004) (referring to widely publicized events involving
noncitizens as well as general economic troubles to explain the reemergence of immigration
policy as a target of reform).
17. See, e.g., Katherine L. Vaughns, Restoring the Rule of Law: Reflections on Fixing
the Immigration System and Exploring Failed Policy Choices, 5 U. MD. L.J. RACE,
RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 151, 185 (2005) (claiming that the potential for effective
immigration policies existed following the 1965 Amendments but that the opportunity
passed due to various shortcomings in subsequent legislation).
18. See JOHNSON, FLOODGATES, supra note 15, at 54 (explaining that the infrastructure
of modern immigration law was created in 1952 with the INA, and "has been amended
almost annually since its passage in 1952 . . . "). In addition, the subsequent history of those
amendments has hardly been consistent, veering from "humane and generous" to "harsher,
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begin with a broader view and then approach reform considering the
motivations that originally created the modern immigration system. This
method will then be applied specifically to removal hearings in the federal
immigration courts and the constitutionally insufficient allowances for
habeas corpus review on appeals from those hearings. The benefits of such
judicial review will then be evaluated by comparing immigration reform to
the criminal procedure revolution that took place in the U.S. court system.
The reaffirmation of the role of the federal courts in immigration through a
restoration of judicial review should be part of the realignment of the
nation’s immigration laws. This inclusion of the judiciary would bring the
nation’s immigration laws closer to their original motivations and would
provide stability in immigration.
I. Past Immigration Reforms—Establishment of the Immigration System
and Subsequent Changes
Ever since the federal government earnestly began implementing a
coherent national immigration policy in the 1880s,19 the domain has been
one of its most volatile areas of law.20 This constant tendency towards
revision stems in large part from the chronic bipolarity of national public
opinion towards immigration and from recurring economic and societal
concerns.21 Nevertheless, the United States has a long, if not complicated,
relationship with noncitizens, and any evaluation of immigration policy
carried out by a reform-minded nation should include not only present

less forgiving, and more insulated from judicial review." KANSTROOM, supra note 12, at
225–26.
19. See GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS,
BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 44–51 (1996) (tracking the development of federal
immigration regulation during the beginning of the nineteenth century and through to the
realization of this authority at the end of that century).
20. See LEMAY, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 6, at 1–5 (describing the cyclical nature of
immigration policy, which reacts to past social, economic, and population concerns while
simultaneously affecting these factors so as to set the stage for the next change in
immigration policy); JOHNSON, FLOODGATES, supra note 15, at 45 ("U.S. immigration law is
famous for its cyclical, turbulent, and ambivalent nature.").
21. See, e.g., Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Conference Paper, America’s Schizophrenic
Immigration Policy: Race, Class, and Reason, 41 B.C. L. REV. 755, 758 (2000) ("America’s
enthusiasm for newcomers has historically been tempered by its skeptical view of outsiders
of different race, ethnicity, economic status, religion, or political affiliation.").
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circumstances but also a wider fidelity to and understanding of the
country’s unparalleled immigration history.22
A. Congress’s Plenary Powers
The history of immigration must begin with Congress, because
under the accepted interpretation of Congress’s constitutional
authority,23 the legislative branch maintains essentially plenary control
over immigration policy choices.24 This dominion not only includes the
ordinary power of Congress to legislate but also considerable autonomy
from the Constitution itself in fashioning these laws: "[O]ver no
conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete
than it is over [immigration policy]."25 Immigration policy is then
principally a creature of politics, and it is this freedom from the sturdier
foundations of the Constitution that has given this area such
uncertainty.26 Thus, any consideration of U.S. immigration policy is
22. See ESMOND WRIGHT, THE AMERICAN DREAM: FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO
REAGAN 544–48 (1996) (illustrating briefly the history of U.S. immigration before
concluding that "[t]he American immigration situation is unprecedented in world history").
The author continues: "To anyone who knows something of the history of nation-states in
Europe, it is obviously no more possible to change the ethnic content of a polity without fear
of consequence than to replace abruptly all the blood in a human body. Yet this is the
experiment upon which America has embarked." Id. at 548.
23. See IRA J. KURZBAN, KURZBAN’S IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK 11–12 (4th ed.
1994) (listing an amalgamation of enumerated constitutional powers and implied rights of
sovereignty that together form the federal power over immigration).
24. See, e.g., FRANK L. AUERBACH, IMMIGRATION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 2 (2d
ed. 1961) (stating the foundational principle that Congress has the constitutional authority to
regulate immigration without judicial oversight into compliance with the Constitution, which
has also been consistently recognized by the Supreme Court).
25. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909). See also
STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY: LAW AND POLITICS IN BRITAIN
AND AMERICA 178–80 (1987) [hereinafter LEGOMSKY, JUDICIARY] (introducing the plenary
power over immigration, shared between the Legislative and Executive branches, which "the
[Supreme] Court has explicitly treated as an exception to the principle of constitutional
review"); see also VICTOR C. ROMERO, ALIENATED: IMMIGRANT RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION,
AND EQUALITY IN AMERICA 9–23 (2005) (attributing the nominal rights currently held by
noncitizens to the growth of the plenary power doctrine). But see JOHNSON, MYTH, supra
note 11, at 14, 17–18 (describing briefly the history of challenges to the plenary power
doctrine and contending that it is an anachronistic approach in contemporary jurisprudence).
26. See Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 1 (1984) ("In a legal firmament transformed by revolutions in due process and equal
protection doctrine and by a new conception of judicial role, immigration law remains the
realm in which government authority is at the zenith, and individual entitlement is at the
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inherently an examination of Congress and the political pressures that
have come into play over the decades.27
Recent constraints placed by Congress on judicial review also
invoke another instance of its plenary authorities: the near-absolute
power to control the jurisdiction of the federal courts.28 "[D]ramatically
limiting the scope of the judiciary’s guaranteed institutional
autonomy,"29 this capability to alter federal jurisdiction has allowed
Congress to reduce the judiciary’s role in immigration adjudications.30
In addition to the judiciary’s lack of control, the executive branch has
historically deferred to Congressional judgment for the boundaries of its
enforcement powers, and for decades Congress has expanded on these
powers.31 The sum total of this authority gives Congress the discretion
to greatly empower the executive agencies to carry out immigration
policy and simultaneously relegate the judiciary to a minimal level of
participation.32

nadir.").
27. See LEMAY, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 6, at 2–5 (partitioning the evolution of U.S.
immigration policy into four general phases, with each new era clearly prompted by
economic, social, political, and demographic changes).
28. See U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 2 ("The judicial power of the United States, shall be
vested in on Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may . . . ordain and
establish."). See also Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 514 (1868) (finding that Congress
holds the power to control the jurisdiction of the federal judiciary). The Supreme Court
recognized this constitutional grant of power when it stated that "[j]urisdiction is power to
declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that
of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause." Id. at 514.
29. CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, WHEN COURTS & CONGRESS COLLIDE: THE STRUGGLE
FOR CONTROL OF AMERICA’S JUDICIAL SYSTEM 31 (2006).
30. See Lenni B. Benson, Making Paper Dolls: How Restrictions on Judicial Review
and the Administrative Process Increase Immigration Cases in the Federal Courts, 51
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 37, 41–43 (2006–2007) [hereinafter Benson, Paper Dolls] (describing
the efforts since 1996 to "reduce the quantity and quality of judicial review of administrative
removal orders").
31. See Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law,
119 YALE L.J. 458, 482–83 (2009) (arguing that the Executive branch in theory possesses
significant influence over immigration policy-making through selective enforcement but that
in practice Congress has exercised control without objection).
32. See Lenni B. Benson, Back to the Future: Congress Attacks the Right to Judicial
Review of Immigration Proceedings, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1411, 1411–19 (1997) (arguing that
limits on judicial review over immigration matters will not give finality to Executive
decisions but rather will increase the legal confusion as complex constitutional questions
become more prevalent).
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B. The Beginning of the Modern Structure

Under Congress’s direction, immigration policy in the U.S. reflected
economic considerations and nativist fears throughout much of its history.33
During the nation’s early decades, the appetite for an abundant labor force
was the primary force shaping immigration policy.34 Nevertheless, there
were restrictions on criminals, slaves, the diseased, and the impoverished,
thus initially establishing the U.S. as generally receptive towards
immigrants though discretely selective.35 In piecemeal fashion, Congress
then began codifying and widening these restrictions, creating blatantly
racially discriminatory classifications during the twentieth century as
nativist sentiments and post-Industrial Revolution economic concerns
turned politically active.36 The push for racial limits on immigration
ultimately produced the Immigration Act of 1924 and the notorious national
origins quota system.37 Structured to favor those ethnicities already present
in the country, the system "effectively ended immigration; cheap labor was
no longer needed."38 The national origins quota remained in effect through
33. See NEUMAN, supra note 19, at 19–43 (arguing that the state governments
regulated discrete categories of immigration since colonial times, labeling the prevailing
notion otherwise as an "open-borders myth"); Richard A. Boswell, Racism and U.S.
Immigration Law: Prospects for Reform After "9/11?", 7 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 315,
322–23 (2003) (explaining that early state prohibitions on allowing any nonwhite person to
become a U.S. citizen agreed with the overall harsh treatment of minorities within the
nation’s borders).
34. See Boswell, supra note 33, at 324 (presenting the U.S. history leading to stricter
immigration controls).
35. See VERNON M. BRIGGS, JR., MASS IMMIGRATION AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST 44–
69 (2d ed. 1996) (noting that there was no cohesive national immigration policy until the
1920s, before which the country treated immigration as a necessary means towards acquiring
a labor force); JOHNSON, FLOODGATES, supra note 15, at 52 (suggesting that immigration
regulation was primarily a state matter prior to the late 1800s and reasonably balanced, but
that the introduction of federal regulation around the turn of the century coincided with new
attitudes towards immigrants).
36. See DANIELS, supra note 16, at 49 ("[F]ears about job-stealing and the lowering of
the standard of living by immigrants willing to work cheap were still shaping the national
mood. The nation was also gripped by xenophobia and a rejection of [Southern] Europe.").
37. Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153 (1924). Noticeably absent were
Asian immigrants, who had been barred for decades from gaining citizenship, and Central
and South American immigrants, who were exempted from the quota system and therefore
could migrate northward freely. BRIGGS, supra note 35, at 67. In addition, immigration
from Africa was essentially ignored. See Hiroshi Motomura, Whose Alien Nation?: Two
Models of Constitutional Immigration Law, 94 MICH. L.R. 1927, 1933 (1996) (noting that
"the descendents of slave immigrants" were virtually disqualified from participating in the
quota system (internal quotations omitted)).
38. BRIGGS, supra note 35, at 68. See also WRIGHT, supra note 22, at 13 (explaining
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the 1960s, amended periodically to reflect unrelated political developments
such as the refugee situations and the ideological conflicts following World
War II.39 Prompted by a desire to bring together the scattered immigration
laws as well as heightened fears of Communism, Congress then created the
first unified system of federal immigration laws with the INA in 1952,40
strengthening the structure of the executive immigration agencies in the
process. This expansive law plainly preserved the national origins quota
and further curtailed immigration from Communist countries.41 As
revealed by subsequent legislative evaluations of the INA, deep-seated
racial beliefs remained central to the legislation:
Without giving credence to any theory of Nordic superiority, the [Senate
Judiciary] subcommittee believes that the adoption of the national
origins formula was a rational and logical method of numerically
restricting immigration in such a manner as to best preserve the
sociological and cultural balance in the population of the United
States . . . [T]he subcommittee holds that the peoples who had made the
greatest contribution to the development of this country were fully
justified in . . . admit[ting] immigrants considered to be more readily
42
assimilable . . . .

Despite its racial language, the INA nevertheless set the stage for the
upcoming changes in immigration law through some decidedly progressive
changes: the removal of explicit racial disqualifications, the recognition of
skilled immigrants as a priority in immigration selections, and the creation
that the legislation controlled immigration rates by setting a maximum annual quota and
allotting each European country an amount proportionate to its current representation in the
U.S.); Boswell, supra note 33, at 324 (identifying the rising immigrant population fueling
the Industrial Revolution and increased internal migration as potential causes for the
tightened immigration legislation of the early 20th century).
39. See AUERBACH, supra note 24, at 11–16 (listing the more notable amendments to
the Immigration Act of 1924, including the War Brides Act in 1945, which assisted soldiers
in gaining citizenship for foreign national spouses married abroad, and the Internal Security
Act in 1950, which intended to protect the U.S. from immigrating Communists and other
criminals).
40. See Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C.). See also JOHNSON, FLOODGATES, supra note 15, at 54 ("A product of
the Cold War, . . . the law is not particularly generous to immigrants."). "The firm
presumption under the INA is that noncitizens are not eligible to enter the United States
unless they prove that they are admissible under the law." Id.
41. See Boswell, supra note 33, at 325 ("The national origin quota was made
permanent in 1924 by enactment of the 1924 National Origins Act which lowered the annual
quota of immigrants allowed into the United States . . . .").
42. WHOM SHALL WE WELCOME: REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION 89 (1953) [hereinafter WHOM SHALL WE WELCOME]).
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of the underlying framework in immigration law generally that persists to
this day.43
C. The 1961 Amendments
Identifiable immigration adjudications also emerged and developed
during the early days of federal immigration policy.44 Prior to the middle of
the twentieth century, these hearings merely served as an extension of
executive enforcement and lacked any vestige of judicial impartiality.45
The long-established availability of the writ of habeas corpus, however,
provided some measure of external review from the federal judiciary, and
until 1952 was "the sole means by which an alien could test the legality of
his or her deportation order . . . [and] challeng[e] Executive interpretations
of the immigration laws."46 The creation of the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) in 1941,47 an executive body which heard appeals from the
immigration adjudications, represented the introduction of administrative
review as a meaningful component of U.S. immigration policy.48
Subsequently, under the newly-enacted Administrative Procedures Act
43. See E.P. HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY,
1798–1965 312 (1981) (portraying the INA as a compromise between the various factions in
that it eliminated blatant racism but kept the veiled racism of the national origins quota).
The INA "embodied the majority opinion in Congress at the time. It also became the focus
of persistent efforts at revision and relaxation of the immigration laws over the following
years . . . ." Id. at 313.
44. See Dory Mitros Durham, Note, The Once and Future Judge: The Rise and Fall
(and Rise?) of Independence in U.S. Immigration Courts, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 655, 658
(2006) ("The structure of adjudication in the immigration context has been in a state of nearconstant movement since Congress first attempted to draft comprehensive immigration
legislation at the turn of the last century.").
45. See id. at 661–64 (explaining that prior to 1952, Congress allowed the federal
immigration agencies to dictate adjudication procedures, leading to immigration officers
serving as the "judge" with only a basic administrative appeals process available).
46. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 305–06 (2001). See Sarah A. Moore, Note, Tearing
Down the Fence Around Immigration Law: Examining the Lack of Judicial Review and the
Impact of the REAL ID Act While Calling for a Broader Reading of Questions of Law to
Encompass "Extreme Cruelty", 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2037, 2043 (2007) (observing that
"the shortcoming of habeas review was that the noncitizen could not seek this form of relief
until he or she was ‘in custody’").
47. Creation of a Board of Immigration Appeals, 5 Fed. Reg. 3502, 3503 (Sept. 4,
1940) (codified as amended at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (2009)).
48. See Durham, supra note 44, at 665 ("[T]he Board’s regulatory creation seems to
reflect the belief that the preexisting adjudicatory structures provided too few procedural
protections for aliens facing exclusion or deportation from the United States.").
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(APA),49 the Supreme Court in 1950 analyzed immigration hearings and
concluded that the executive immigration agencies were required to
conduct formal adjudication procedures.50 The Court observed that a
central purpose of the APA, to "curtail and change the practice of
embodying in one person or agency the duties of prosecutor and judge,"
clearly applied to immigration proceedings.51 Five years later, following
the overhaul of the immigration system under the INA, the Supreme Court
declared that the APA also provided for review of agency action in federal
district court.52 This decision, repudiating earlier efforts by Congress to
exempt immigration proceedings from this provision of the APA,53 stated
that "[t]he legislative history of both the Administrative Procedure Act and
the 1952 Immigration Act supports [the noncitizen’s] rights to full judicial
review of this deportation order."54 The Court also confirmed in 1953 a
noncitizen’s constitutional right to petition the federal courts for habeas
review, further solidifying the role of courts in immigration policy.55 Thus,
49. Ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5
U.S.C.). See also Durham, supra note 44, at 665 (explaining that the transformation of
immigration hearings "echoed the revolutions in administrative agency adjudications
generally that had been effected by the passage of the APA in 1946").
50. See Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 51 (1950) (holding that
immigration adjudications were required by the INA and Due Process requirements, and
therefore the APA’s formal adjudication procedures applied). The APA did not universally
impose adjudication procedure standards on the agencies but rather interpreted each
agency’s organic statute to determine which standards were appropriate. Id. at 36.
Accordingly, the applicability of formal adjudication procedures came down to statutory
interpretation and the parsing of Congressional language. See Durham, supra note 44, at
666 (explaining that "each agency was forced to struggle to define the specific requirements
that the APA itself, read together with individual organic statutes, placed upon its day-to-day
procedures").
51. See Wong Yang Sung, 339 U.S. at 41 (noting that this theme "was reiterated
throughout the legislative history of the Act").
52. See Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 52–53 (1955) (holding that the APA
provides another avenue of judicial review for immigration adjudications conducted under
the INA, in addition to the existing habeas review).
53. See Deportation and Exclusion: A Continuing Dialogue Between Congress and
the Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 760, 771 (1962) [hereinafter Deportation and Exclusion]
(explaining that Congress’s answer to Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath was legislation
"specifically exempting [the primary enforcement body under the INA] from the hearing
requirements of the APA"). The Supreme Court initially agreed that the legislation did
indeed create an exemption for the INA and was constitutionally sound. See Marcello v.
Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955) ("Unless we are to require the Congress to employ magical
passwords in order to effectuate an exemption from the Administrative Procedure Act, we
must hold that the present statute expressly supersedes the hearing provisions of that Act.").
54. Shaughnessy, 349 U.S. at 51–52.
55. See Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 240 (1953) ("[O]ne against whom a
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by the mid-1950s, an immigrant facing deportation received a formal
adjudication with the ability to seek review in an administrative body, in
federal district court, and in the federal courts of appeal.56
In response to this rather sudden expansion of judicial procedures,
Congress reclaimed control in 1961 by "prescribing for the first time a
statutory scheme for judicial review of deportation and exclusion orders."57
The 1961 Amendments, located in section 106 of the INA,58 intended to
prevent noncitizens from protracting the enforcement of final deportation
decisions59 and settled on a conventional role for the judiciary in
immigration adjudications.60 Resisting the "consistent congressional desire
to limit judicial participation in immigration matters,"61 Congress
recognized that "[a]liens seeking review of administrative orders should be
deportation order is outstanding but not executed, may at once move, by means of a
declaratory judgment, to challenge the administrative process insofar as the substantive law
pertaining to deportation permits challenge.").
56. See generally Durham, supra note 44 and accompanying text (showing the
progression of immigrant rights in the court system). See also Heikkila, 345 U.S. at 240
(expanding immigrant rights in federal courts).
57. Deportation and Exclusion, supra note 53, at 760. But see Gerald Seipp, Federal
Court Jurisdiction to Review Immigration Decisions: A Tug of War Between the Three
Branches, 07-04 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1 (2007) (noting that the references to deportation
orders and exclusion orders are outdated, as Congress "combined deportation [removing the
noncitizen from the country] and exclusion hearings [barring the noncitizen from entering
the country], as of April 1, 1997, into a unified ‘removal’ hearing process").
58. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 87-301, 75 Stat. 650 (1961)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). See also Seipp, supra note 57
(placing the 1961 Amendment at the beginning of decades of Congressional efforts to
clearly define judicial review of immigration proceedings).
59. See H.R. Rep 87-1086, pt. 2, at 2967 (1961) (portraying the underlying problem as
"the growing frequency of judicial actions being instituted by undesirable aliens whose cases
have no legal basis or merit, but which are brought solely for the purpose of preventing or
delaying indefinitely their deportation from this country"). The Report contends that these
manipulative noncitizens are "mostly subversives, gangsters, immoral, or narcotic peddlers,
[who] manage to protract their stay here indefinitely only because their ill-gotten gains
permit them to procure the services of astute attorneys who know how to skillfully exploit
the judicial process." Id. See also Deportation and Exclusion, supra note 53, at 760 nn.3–4
(describing the contentious legislative battle in the Senate over constricting judicial review
as well as the persistent conviction by some Representatives that noncitizens abused judicial
review).
60. See H.R. Rep 87-1086, pt. 1, at 2966 (1961) ("The purpose . . . is to create a single,
separate, statutory form of judicial review of administrative orders for the deportation and
exclusion of aliens from the United States . . . ." (emphasis added)). The Report also quoted
testimony from a committee hearing: "There are several objections to the divergent methods
of review. They lack uniformity . . . . There is need for expedition, orderly venue, and the
avoiding of repetitious court proceedings." Id. at 2970.
61. Deportation and Exclusion, supra note 53, at 761.
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given full and fair opportunity to do so . . . ."62 Thus, the 1961 Amendment
established that the federal courts of appeals would review all orders of
deportation if appealed within six months.63 However, exclusion orders
would remain reviewable solely in the district courts through habeas
petitions.64 This divergent treatment stemmed from the belief that
noncitizens should not be granted anything but the most minimal access to
the U.S. court system simply by appearing at the border and triggering an
exclusion hearing.65
Yet, even with the narrower provision for exclusion hearings, the 1961
Amendment stands as a congressional acknowledgement of the federal
judiciary’s quintessential function as the check on executive enforcement
practices.66 Confronted with the inevitability of judicial involvement
through a habeas petition and the courts’ oversight of agency action through
the APA, Congress simply decided to reassert its role as immigration
policy-maker.67 The sensible achievements of the 1961 Amendment quietly
endured for more than three decades,68 but the looming social revolutions
62. H.R. Rep. 87-1086, pt. 2, at 2968 (1961). The Report also contained a message
from former President Dwight Eisenhower: "Constitutional due process wisely confers upon
any alien, whatever the charge, the right to challenge in the courts the Government’s finding
of deportability." Id.
63. See H.R. Rep. 87-1086, pt. 2, at 2973 (1961) (concluding that "[i]t is obvious that
6 months is sufficient and far beyond the realms of any claim of unfairness, for an alien to
determine whether he really has a case upon which he should seek judicial review and to
prepare therefore"). See also Deportation and Exclusion, supra note 53, at 762 n.18
(suggesting that the law operates under the assumption that all petitions for review are
abuses of the system and that the scarcity and complexity of the courts of appeals would
discourage petitions for review since most immigrants did not have the necessary resources).
64. See Deportation and Exclusion, supra note 53, at 762 (commenting on the
"ambivalent" nature of the 1961 Amendment, in that it solidifies review of deportation
orders while also refusing direct judicial review of exclusion orders).
65. See H.R. Rep. 87-1086, pt. 2, at 2977 (1961) (stating that "no sound reason
appears to the committee why excluded aliens arriving at the various ports in the United
States should be permitted to burden an already overburdened court system"). But see
Deportation and Exclusion, supra note 53, at 786–88 (arguing that judicial review aims to
prevent arbitrary enforcement decisions as well as protect individuals, and that the emphasis
placed on the noncitizen’s location fails to take into account this dual responsibility).
66. See Deportation and Enforcement, supra note 53, at 761 (referring to the 1961
Amendment as "the most recent episode in a long standing controversy between the courts
and Congress in the area of immigration procedures and practices").
67. See id. at 761–62 (describing the 1961 Amendment as both an expression of
Congressional beliefs regarding immigration as well as a reaction to the Supreme Court’s
insistence on judicial involvement in immigration matters).
68. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 46, at 2044–45 (commenting that congressional
attitudes towards judicial review of immigration adjudications soured during the mid-1990s).

476

17 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & SOC. JUST. 463 (2011)

and the unprecedented legislation of the 1960s soon captivated the nation
and profoundly altered the course of modern immigration.
D. The 1965 Amendments
In the years following the 1952 enactment of the INA, with its
perpetuation of the national origins system, politicians had already begun
agitating for the "progressive liberalization of immigration policy."69 As
soon as 1953, an immigration commission organized by President Harry
Truman summarized public opinion towards the INA as follows:
The consensus was to the effect that the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952 injures our people at home, causes much resentment against
us abroad, and impairs our position among the free nations, great and
small, whose friendships and understanding is necessary if we are to
70
meet and overcome the totalitarian menace.

Although the impending Cold War clearly served as the primary
inspiration to seek reform of the INA, the commission also cited
considerations of equality and diversity, effectively rejecting the underlying
rationale of the quota system.71 Viewing immigration policy as simply
another means to undermine Communist countries,72 Congress all but
ignored the commission’s report.73
As the post-war 1950s evolved into the turbulent 1960s, an
increasingly mobilized constituency was demanding that Congress turn its
attention to critical domestic issues.74 After decades of hard work, the
69. See HUTCHINSON, supra note 43, at 314 (outlining the period of relative stability
immediately following the creation of the INA and the increasing efforts to modify it with
each passing year).
70. WHOM SHALL WE WELCOME, supra note 42, at 19.
71. See id. at xii–xv (listing "truths" about the United States related to immigration
policy, including the belief that "American national unity has been achieved without national
uniformity").
72. See DANIELS, supra note 16, at 125–26 (describing refugee legislation during the
1950s as intended primarily for immigrants from Communist or formerly Fascist nations).
73. See id. at 122–23 (observing that Congress declined to hold hearings on the
report). "The commission’s work was not entirely futile, however, and Whom Shall We
Welcome did become a liberal icon. The Truman commission’s report provided a national
agenda largely realized in 1965, with a final element accepted in 1980 . . . ." Id. at 123.
74. See David Farber & Beth Bailey, Introduction, THE COLUMBIA GUIDE TO AMERICA
IN THE 1960S 1, 1–12 (David Farber & Beth Bailey eds., Columbia Univ. Press 2001)
(describing the political obsession with international military concerns following World War
II until "an unexpected revolution" broke out at home).
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African-American civil rights movement had reached a critical stage.75 The
escalating war in Vietnam was steadily eroding the relationship between
segments of the nation and the federal government.76 Additionally,
countercultural and egalitarian sentiments were on the rise,77 feminism was
experiencing a resurgence,78 and progressive developments were altering
the legal landscape, including the criminal justice system.79 These
expanding campaigns for equality, culminating in "[t]he equal-rights
revolution that ended legally sanctioned racism and sexism,"80 also inspired
Congress to consolidate behind the enduring drive to end the national
origins quota system and enact the unparalleled Immigration Act of 1965.81
The legislative history of the 1965 Amendments reflects this
momentum, and champions "a new system of selection designed to be fair,
rational, humane, and in the national interest."82 In practice the national
origins system had not fared well,83 though Congress itself was partially
75. See id. at 13–19 (reviewing the sequence of events during the first few years of the
1960s that drove the civil rights movement into the national spotlight). "The civil rights
movement did not start in the 1960s. . . . In the 1960s, however, for the first time, black
Americans in large numbers . . . demanded their rights as citizens under the United States
Constitution." Id. at 13.
76. See WRIGHT, supra note 22, at 387 ("Vietnam . . . destroyed credibility within the
American political process [because] [t]he public came to distrust its leaders, and many
officials distrusted the public.").
77. See Farber & Bailey, supra note 74, at 55–63 (juxtaposing the various sectors of
1960s culture, including consumerist, youth, black, and nonconformist subcultures, and
asserting that "[a]ll expressed a growing acceptance of cultural pluralism"). This approval of
"greater cultural diversity and social experimentation" was also indicative of the majority
support for "the idea that personal expression and individual freedom were a critical aspect
of the American way of life." Id. at 62–63.
78. See WRIGHT, supra note 22, at 439–40 (outlining the causes for the revival of the
feminism movement, including the variety of intellectual, economic, medical, and political
factors).
79. See Rusty L. Monhollon, Law and Justice, in THE COLUMBIA GUIDE TO THE 1960S
281, 281–87 (David Farber & Beth Bailey eds., Columbia Univ. Press 2001) (commenting
on the liberal advances made by the federal government, especially the Supreme Court, in
areas such as civil liberties, education, and privacy).
80. Farber & Bailey, supra note 74, at 76.
81. See BRIGGS, supra note 35, at 106 (contending that "there was a direct link
between [immigration reform in 1965] and the success of civil rights legislation"); Boswell,
supra note 33, at 326–28 (arguing that the 1965 Amendments to the INA formed part of a
larger political collaboration to improve the civil rights reputation of the U.S. abroad).
82. S. REP. NO. 89-748, at 13 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3328, 3332. See
generally JOHN F. KENNEDY, A NATION OF IMMIGRANTS (1964) (presenting the important
role that immigration has played in the development of the United States and reasoning for
the eradication of the national origins system).
83. See H.R. REP. NO. 89-745, at 11 (1965) ("The national origins system has failed to
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responsible due to years of special allowances for refugees.84 Nevertheless,
despite some opposition,85 both houses showed wide support for the bill.86
In essence, the legislation replaced the former race-based admissions
scheme with a preference system weighted towards family reunification and
skilled workers.87
Congress left the majority of the INA intact,
intentionally limiting its efforts to the national origins system.88 In a
concession to restrictionist members of Congress, however, the bill also
included immigration restrictions from the Western Hemisphere for the first
time.89 These focused efforts, however, removed manifest racism from the
INA and deeply altered both immigration patterns and immigration
maintain the ethnic balance of the American population as it was designed and intended
since the nations favored with the high quotas have left their quotas largely unused.").
84. See DANIELS, supra note 16, at 115 (commenting that by 1965 the national origins
system "was more like a colander than a shield"). See also S. REP. NO. 89-748, at 3–4
(1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3328, 3331–32 (expressing the congressional
sentiment that the refugee adjustments were a necessary measure); H.R. REP. NO. 89-745, at
12 (1965) (same). Congress noticeably attempted to distance itself from the 1924
legislation, stressing its humanitarian efforts despite the strictures of the quota system. See
S. REP. NO. 89-748, at 4 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3328, 3331 ("The
performance of the Congress in the field of immigration in the postwar period has been far
more generous and sympathetic than adherence to the national origins system alone would
allow . . . .").
85. See S. REP. NO. 89-748, at 19 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3328, 334649 ("[N]o one should be so naïve as to believe that the adoption of this bill will end the cries
to change our immigration laws."). The Representative then forecasts that the 1965
Amendments "would only be the opening wedge in a continuing effort to chip and chip and
chip until our immigration laws would be a shambles." Id. at 3346.
86. See GIMPEL & EDWARDS, supra note 10, at 108–09 (giving the final vote tallies as
320-69 in the House and 76-18 in the Senate). See also LEMAY, ANATOMY, supra note 15,
at 11–12 (observing that in the years prior to the 1965 Amendments, large numbers of
Congressmen were submitting their own bills to reform immigration laws).
87. See H.R. REP. NO. 89-745, at 12 (1965) (summarizing the admissions system as
"based upon first come, first served, without regard to place of birth, within the preference
categories, and subject to specified limitations"); S. REP. NO. 89-748, at 1–2 (1965),
reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3328, 3329–30 (noting that the new system gave priority "to
close relatives of U.S. citizens . . . , to aliens who are members of the professions, arts, or
sciences, and to skilled or unskilled laborers who are needed in the United States, and to
certain refugees").
88. See S. REP. NO. 89-748, at 1–2 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3328, 3329
(expressing the limited purpose of the 1965 Amendments as removing the national origins
system); H.R. REP. NO. 89-745, at 13 (1965) (same). But see HUTCHINSON, supra note 43, at
378 (noting that the 1965 Act went further than the 1952 Act "by adding several new
components to the structure of immigration law and policy").
89. See BRIGGS, supra note 35, at 110 (explaining that a ceiling on immigration from
Latin America was a compromise necessary to gain the support needed to pass the
legislation).
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policy.90 In the words of President Lyndon Johnson at the signing of the
bill:
[The 1965 Amendments] repair a very deep and painful flaw in the
fabric of American justice. It corrects a cruel and enduring wrong in the
conduct of the American nation . . . . The fairness of [the new] standard
is so self-evident that we may well wonder that it has not always been
91
applied.

The substance of the 1965 Amendments paralleled contemporaneous
developments in other areas of U.S. politics and law.92 The combined
effect of these other changes suggests a compelling rationale for the 1965
Amendments far beyond the desire to improve the American reputation
abroad for Cold War purposes.93 The seminal achievement of the 1960s,
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,94 exemplified the evolving attitudes about
race and the legal structure.95 Advances in education, gender equality, and
civil liberties in general demonstrated both Congress and the Supreme
Court’s willingness to heed the appeals for progressive change.96 Finally,
the protection of constitutional rights in criminal matters evinced a renewed
In conjunction with these
commitment to personal liberties.97
90. See JOHNSON, FLOODGATES, supra note 15, at 51 (referring to 1965 as a
"watershed in U.S. immigration policy" before adding that immigration laws continue to
have subtler but equally discriminatory effects).
91. President’s Message to Congress, Oct. 3, 1965.
92. See Monhollon, supra note 79, at 281–87 (recounting the major legal occurrences
in the U.S. of the decade for a host of separate groups, including minorities and women);
BRIGGS, supra note 35, at 106 ("Between 1964 and 1966 the most ambitious domestic
reform agenda in the nation’s history was proposed and enacted.").
93. See JOHNSON, FLOODGATES, supra note 15, at 51 ("The civil rights movement of
the 1950s and 1960s . . . dramatically changed the law in ways completely at odds with the
racial exclusions in place in the U.S. immigration laws."); BRIGGS, supra note 35, at 106–07
(suggesting that the proscription against racial categorization of citizens created a "political
climate" favorable to progressive immigration legislation).
94. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241.
95. See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson & Bill Ong Hing, The Immigrant Rights Marches of
2006 and the Prospects for a New Civil Rights Movement, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99,
110–12 (2007) (crediting the coalescence of racially disparate groups as a central
explanation for the success of the African-American civil rights movement). The authors
suggest that a combination of coordinated and sustained efforts at the local level propelled a
hesitant federal government into passing the Civil Rights Act. Id.
96. See Monhollon, supra note 79, at 281–82 (describing how "altered conceptions of
justice and methods for promoting them" spurred the federal government into action). The
author establishes three principles that served as guideposts for many of the
accomplishments during this time: a commitment to equal protection, a standardized system
of justice nation-wide, and an accessible and active court system. Id.
97. See infra Part V.B.i–ii (describing the "criminal procedure revolution" and its
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developments, the 1965 Amendments explicitly eliminated race from the
immigration admissions system, enjoyed wide support in Congress, and
derived at least in part from the historic ideals of fairness and equality.98
All of these related achievements "reflected a vision of distributive justice
in which the government assumed responsibility for actively protecting
citizens’ individual rights and economic opportunities . . . ."99
E. Subsequent Reform—Increasing Enforcement, Decreasing Judicial
Review
In spite of their shared values, the lasting impact of these political
and legal transformations was not uniform—some prospered while
others faltered.100 Within immigration law, the 1965 Amendments
initially provided a measure of stability, which lasted well over a
decade.101 However, in the years following the 1965 Amendments, the
country witnessed a large and unexpected influx of immigrants,102 a

legacy).
98. See Gabriel J. Chin, The Civil Rights Revolution Comes to Immigration Law: A
New Look at the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, 75 N.C. L. REV. 273, 300–02
(1996) (citing the legislative history of the 1965 Amendments to confirm the congressional
concern with the lack of racial equality in immigration law). But see Boswell, supra note
33, at 332–46 (examining the "barriers" against immigration into the U.S. which the 1965
Amendments did not remove, including barriers in the legal structure, the traditional norms
of immigration law, and continued biases from both politicians and the public). While the
1965 Amendments did not fashion a perfect system of immigration, the author admits that
"[i]n retrospect, it appears that the 1965 Amendments have been the last positive
immigration reform of the twentieth century." Id. at 332.
99. Monhollon, supra note 79, at 281. But see BRIGGS, supra note 35, at 7–8
(maintaining that the 1965 Amendments, despite "purging the immigration statutes of the
explicit racism inherent in the national origin system," nevertheless perpetuated restricted
amounts of immigration).
100. See Monhollon, supra note 79, at 286–87 (noting that "racial and gender
equality . . . have now become widely accepted" while "abortion and the outlawing of
school-sponsored prayer continue to cause major political conflict").
101. See DANIELS, supra note 16, at 220 (explaining the variety of events that "pushed
immigration policy to the fore," including economic fears and renewed anti-immigrant
sentiments). But see Boswell, supra note 33, at 329 (observing that a reaction against the
1965 Amendments occurred as soon as the early 1970s); BRIGGS, supra note 35, at 158
(lamenting the lack of congressional action in immigration in the years after the 1965
Amendments despite rising issues such as undocumented immigration).
102. See LEMAY, ANATOMY, supra note 15, at 13–17 (describing the declining
immigration from Europe and the concurrent rise in immigration from Asian and Latin
American countries).
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development that Congress had actually attempted to avoid.103 This new
wave of immigration, paired with national economic troubles, pushed
Congress once again towards immigration reform.104 "In the process [of
debating immigration policy], old ghosts of racial and ethnic tensions
would be resurrected once again, albeit dressed in more muted and
restrained political language."105 A critical cause of the renewed tension
was a massive increase in undocumented immigration, which had
ironically been spurred by the cap on immigration from the Western
Hemisphere and the consequent "backlogs in legal visa-processing
time . . . thereby increasing pressure to enter without inspection."106
Though relatively new to immigration policy debates, undocumented
immigration came to be the true impetus behind the next significant
immigration legislation, the Immigration Reform and Control Act of
1986 (IRCA),107 as well as the dominant theme in every immigration
policy debate in the ensuing decades.108
IRCA focused primarily on enforcement in the context of labor and
employment,109 and most subsequent immigration legislation of
importance would concentrate on domestic enforcement in some
fashion.110 This legislation contained four central directives: sanctions
against U.S. employers of undocumented immigrants, stricter
enforcement controls, and the formation of both amnesty and guest
103. See BRIGGS, supra note 35, at 109–14 (outlining the debates and compromises that
ultimately produced the 1965 Amendments and which centered largely on the details of the
new preference system and its attempts to control immigration).
104. See LEMAY, ANATOMY, supra note 15, at 25–27 (describing the "growing sense of
crisis" during the 1970s in response to increased undocumented immigration).
105. HAYES, supra note 7, at 18.
106. KANSTROOM, supra note 12, at 225.
107. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat.
3359 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C).
108. See LEMAY, ANATOMY, supra note 15, at 21–25 (showing that undocumented
immigrants formed a large part in the massive upsurge of immigration and thus came to
dominate the perception of immigration); BRIGGS, supra note 35, at 154–58 (explaining the
"explosion of illegal immigration" partially through the termination of the bracero guest
worker program in 1964, which had established a pattern of migration by Mexican laborers
in seasonal employment in the U.S. agricultural industry).
109. See BRIGGS, supra note 35, at 163 ("The passage of IRCA produced the most
extensive legislation in the area of employment law in the United States in two
decades . . . .").
110. See DANIELS, supra note 16, at 219 (commenting that by the mid-1980s, proposals
for immigration reform came from a range of ideological stance, but that generally
immigration reform "meant undoing, somehow, much of the unintended consequences of the
1965 act").
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worker programs.111 Immigration adjudications lay beyond the scope of
the law and thus continued to operate in much the same fashion as they
had since the 1961 Amendment.112 This included the federal judiciary’s
appellate role, maintaining an important external check on the process of
deportation for immigration proceedings and continuing the "public
perception of . . . appropriate procedural fairness."113
The increased emphasis on enforcement in IRCA signaled a
significant transition in immigration policy that would more clearly
materialize in the 1990s.114 Immigration had grown more contentious as
the public debate increasingly focused on negative effects of immigrants
within the country.115 Congress reacted by passing two pieces of
legislation in 1996, the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996 (AEDPA)116 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA).117 Designed to tighten the influx
and regulate the presence of immigrants in the country, the laws
"expanded the litany of crimes for which aliens can be summarily
deported, eliminated waiver of deportation relief, and precluded judicial
review of certain deportation orders."118 The legislation also completely
removed the 1961 Amendments, permitting only narrow allowances for
federal judicial review and completely prohibiting review for certain

111.

See Francisco L. Rivera-Batiz, Introduction to U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY REFORM
1980S: A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT 2–10 (Francisco L. Rivera-Batiz et al. eds.,
1991) (expressing doubt as to the success of all four components of the IRCA, but noting
that measuring the progress of the law is inherently difficult due to the nature of
undocumented immigration).
112. See Durham, supra note 44, at 675 ("Immigration judges were adjudicating the
same types of controversies that their predecessors had adjudicated since the turn of the
century, although with greater independence from the much larger and more powerful INS.")
113. Id. at 676.
114. See DANIELS, supra note 16, at 232–47 (explaining the rise in public sentiments
against immigration and Congress’s reaction to this shift through "get tough" legislation).
115. Id. at 239–40 (detailing the increased media scrutiny received by immigrants
generally, and especially undocumented immigrants, as well the government agencies
responsible for immigration matters).
116. Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
117. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
118. Sara A. Martin, Postcards From the Border: A Result-Oriented Analysis of
Immigration Reform Under the AEDPA and IIRIRA, 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 683, 683–84
(1999). The author notes that the terms "Orwellian," "Kafkaesque," and "draconian" were
used by critics to characterize the two pieces of legislation. Id. at 683–84.
IN THE
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criminal deportees.119 Federal courts, which had for decades served as
courts of appeal for immigration proceedings, began to see themselves
removed from the picture.120 The legislation prompted confusion,
however, especially as to the extent to which habeas corpus review still
remained.121 The circuit split that developed was resolved by the
Supreme Court in 2001 in INS v. St. Cyr,122 ruling that federal habeas
review remained available as Congress had not clearly eliminated it
through IIRIRA.
Congress’s response to St. Cyr came four years later with the REAL
ID Act of 2005 (RIDA), the last and currently controlling law of a series
of laws aimed at removing the federal courts from immigration.123
Included in the law was an explicit denial of traditional habeas
review,124 which had been an important mechanism in immigration law
119. See id. at 701–06 (describing the restrictions on review by the federal courts as
"the most controversial portions of the new legislation"). See also Andrea Lovell, The
Proper Scope of Habeas Corpus Review in Civil Removal Proceedings, 73 WASH. L. REV.
459, 463–65 (1998) (noting that the legislation was prompted partially by fears of increasing
criminal activity and thus treated criminal immigrants particularly harshly).
120. See, e.g., KANSTROOM, supra note 12, at 229 ("If judicial review of deportation
orders is an essential part of the rule of law, then 1996 could well have been the year in
which the rule of deportation law died.").
121. See Lovell, supra note 119, at 459–61 (reviewing the difficulty that courts had in
deciding how to apply the language of IIRIRA to habeas petitions in light of the unique
circumstances of their habeas corpus responsibilities).
122. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 314 (2001) (finding that federal courts retained
the ability to hear habeas corpus petitions). The Court considered whether federal courts
retained jurisdiction under the general habeas corpus statute. Id. at 298. In St. Cyr, INS
enacted removal proceedings against Enrico St. Cyr in April 1997, more than a year after his
criminal conviction. Id. at 293. In the intermediate period between St. Cyr’s conviction and
the commencement of removal proceedings, the AEDPA and the IIRIRA were enacted by
Congress, eliminating the possibility for waiver of deportation at the discretion of the
Attorney General. Id. at 292–93. The Court reiterated the viewpoint that statutes must be
interpreted, if possible, to avoid constitutional problems; a presumption that ran against the
viewpoint argued by INS. Id. at 300. The Court found support from the historical basis of
habeas corpus and its important role in deportation orders. Id. at 301–03. Additionally, the
Court found that even where judicial review was precluded, the Court was still permitted
limited review of habeas corpus. Id. at 311–12. The Court expressed some dismay at
Congress’s rather dismissive treatment of habeas corpus: "[T]o conclude that the writ is no
longer available in this context would represent a departure from historical practice in
immigration law. The writ of habeas corpus has always been available to review the legality
of Executive detention." Id. at 305.
123. Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, The Global War on
Terror, and Tsunami Relief, Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, 119 Stat. 231, 302 (2005) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 8 & 49 U.S.C.).
124. See Jennifer Norako, Accuracy or Fairness?: The Meaning of Habeas Corpus
Review After Boumediene v. Bush And Its Implications On Alien Removal Orders, 58 AM.
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"since the enactment of the Judiciary Act of 1789."125 Under Supreme
Court precedent, however, the venerated habeas corpus petition cannot
be denied without offering a sufficient replacement.126 With this in
mind, Congress crafted a seemingly suitable alternate: judicial review
can now only occur after all administrative proceedings were exhausted
and only regarding "constitutional claims and questions of law."127
Habeas review traditionally has been thought of as a challenge to the
legality of executive detention, not any factual determinations behind
it,128 and therefore RIDA’s new language initially appears to track this
standard. As will be discussed below, recent developments in habeas
corpus jurisprudence have put the validity of RIDA in doubt.
II. Current Process of Removal Proceeding
Prior to evaluating any policy choices as manifested in
immigration removal hearings, it is helpful to briefly examine the
typical components and processes of such hearings. As with most
governmental operations, Congress designs the procedures and
allocates the authority necessary to carry out its policy determinations.
Executive agencies then carry out these mandates and craft appropriate
regulations as needed, and the Judiciary reviews appeals of final
decisions to ensure legitimate law and proper procedure. This familiar
structure, however, has been altered in the immigration context by
Congress and the executive branch through a controversial emphasis
on the first two stages.129 Though the federal Judiciary theoretically
U. L. REV. 1611, 1622 (2009) (noting that Congress’s intent to replace habeas corpus review
was unambiguous, purportedly to answer the Supreme Court’s ruling in St. Cyr).
125. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 305.
126. Id. at 305 (observing that the Suspension Clause of the Constitution requires that
unless Congress formally revokes the writ of habeas corpus, it must provide a suitable
alternative should it remove the availability of the writ).
127. Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, The Global War on
Terror, and Tsunami Relief, Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, § 106, 119 Stat. 231, 302, 310
(2005).
128. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 306–07 (remarking that in the immigration context, a
habeas corpus petition was historically "the sole means by which an alien could test the
legality of his or her deportation order" (emphasis added)).
129. See generally Benson, Paper Dolls, supra note 30 (blaming the barriers placed
between federal courts for the severe issues plaguing immigration adjudications and the
many parties involved). See also Jill E. Family, A Broader View of the Immigration
Adjudication Problem, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 595, 599–600 (2009) (viewing all three levels
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maintains its traditional role, immigration law now largely concludes
at the enforcement stage.130 This atypical arrangement not only reveals
past policy considerations but consequently affects the future behavior
of the other actors.
It also should be noted that immigration is an entirely federal
domain. As early as 1849, the Supreme Court insinuated that
immigration policy belonged to the federal government,131 and
unequivocally stated so by the 1880s.132 Though the constitutional and
theoretical rationales for this "plenary power" are not absolutely
accepted,133 this long-standing doctrine remains foundational to
immigration policy.134 Despite revived efforts by state and local
governments to regulate immigration135 and federal agencies’ recent
collaborations with municipal authorities,136 immigration remains a
federal prerogative. Consequently, immigration reform as a matter of
course will take place at the federal level and on the national stage.

of immigration adjudication, those being the two administrative courts and then the federal
judiciary, in dire need of reform).
130. See Family, supra note 129, at 600–04 (describing the many problems faced by all
judges involved in immigration adjudications that hamper their ability to produce impartial
and adequate rulings). The author views high caseloads, politicized hiring and firing
processes, and inadequate representation as the main problems. Id.
131. See LEGOMSKY, JUDICIARY, supra note 25, at 178–82 (describing a Supreme Court
ruling that a state tax on the "importation of alien passengers . . . usurped an exclusively
federal power").
132. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 604–06 (1889) (holding that the power
to exclude aliens is an inherent authority of the sovereign federal government that does not
depend on an enumerated power).
133. See, e.g., Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration
Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 574 (2008) (referring to the federal government’s
undivided power over immigration policy as "the exclusivity lie").
134. See AUERBACH, supra note 24, at 2 (explaining Congress’s plenary power over
immigration shared with the Executive branch); and LEGOMSKY, supra note 25, at 178–80
(same).
135. See Rodríguez, supra note 133, at 581–90 (presenting an illustration of states’
rather comprehensive approaches to immigrants within their borders).
136. See generally Maria Fernanda Parra-Chico, An Up-Close Perspective: The
Enforcement of Federal Immigration Laws by State and Local Police, 7 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC.
JUST. 321, 323–31 (2008) (detailing the history and current enthusiasm for utilizing local
authorities to assist the federal agencies in enforcing immigration policy).
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A. Executive Enforcement Producing Removal Hearings

All removal hearings begin with some form of contact between
the noncitizen and one of three federal agencies tasked with initiating
such proceedings.137 Customs and Border Protection (CBP) patrols the
physical borders as well as ports-of-entry, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) investigates and pursues immigration violations
within the nation, and Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS)
oversees lawful immigration into the country and monitors those
immigrants lawfully present.138 Whether it is CIS mailing a summons
to a permanent resident charged with a fraudulent marriage139 or ICE
arresting hundreds of employees during a workplace raid and handdelivering the summons while they sit in detention, 140 these noncitizens
are now respondents in an immigration court proceeding.
Although immigration adjudications remain technically civil
hearings, immigration enforcement measures have become highly
criminalized in a number of manners.141 First and most importantly,
the use of criminal convictions as cause for removal has spiked since
Congress began emphasizing criminality as a cause for deportation.142
137. 8 C.F.R. § 239.1 (2005). See also Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 6 U.S.C.) (explaining
the structure of federal agencies within the Department of Homeland Security since 2002,
and the immigration courts which remain within the Department of Justice and, thus,
separate from other immigration agencies).
138. See Stephen Yale-Loehr et al., Overview of Immigration Law, 1727 PLI/Corp 73,
83 (2009) (presenting a brief outline of the federal agencies involved in immigration and
their responsibilities).
139. See Dinesh Shenoy & Salima Oines Khakoo, One Strike and You’re Out! The
Crumbling Distinction Between the Criminal and the Civil for Immigrants in the TwentyFirst Century, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 135, 138–43 (2008) (clarifying that all aliens,
defined as any person who is not a full-fledged citizen of the United States, are at risk of
deportation, including permanent residents).
140. Cf. Erik Camayd-Freixas, Raids, Rights and Reform: The Postville Case and the
Immigration Crisis, 2 DEPAUL J. FOR SOC. JUST. 1, 1–5 (2008) (presenting an overview of
the notorious raid in Postville, Iowa by ICE in 2008 that arrested and detained hundreds of
undocumented workers).
141. See generally Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration
Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469,
472–73 (2007) (remarking that courts have long insisted that deportation is not a criminal
punishment, and consequently that immigration hearings are purely civil in nature, yet many
criminal elements are currently present in the immigration system). The author describes an
"emerging trend in U.S. immigration law [of the] heightened use of criminal enforcement
strategies, both in setting immigration priorities and in executing them." Id. at 475.
142. See Juliet Stumpf, Fitting Punishment, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1683, 1720–28
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Any noncitizen, including permanent residents, is susceptible to the
"collateral effects" of deportation.143 Second, the raid and detention
practices of ICE push the boundaries of acceptable government action
and seemingly violate the most basic norms of criminal procedure
law.144 Despite the impact on immigrant families and the questionable
reliability of the routines, they continue to be widely employed.145
Third, federal agencies increasingly make use of state and local
authorities to carry out their goals.146 Equipped with greater access to
a national immigration database and a working relationship with ICE,
some local police forces have been authorized to enforce federal
immigration laws.147

(2009) (describing the "major expansion of immigration sanctions, higher levels of
enforcement, and a narrowing of avenues for the government to exercise discretionary relief
from removal" that took place in the 1980s and 1990s).
143. See Shenoy & Khakoo, supra note 139, at 151–57 (remarking on the low standards
required for a noncitizen to be deemed a criminal for purposes of potentially triggering
removal hearings). Essentially any type of acceptance of criminal wrongdoing by the
noncitizen will suffice, including the mere admittance of facts that could suffice for a
conviction. Id. See also Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1492–94 (2010) (holding that
undocumented defendants have a right under the Sixth Amendment to be told by their
attorney of the risk of deportation attached to various criminal convictions).
144. See Raquel Aldana, Of Katz and "Aliens": Privacy Expectations and the
Immigration Raids, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1081, 1129 (seeking to limit the current
autonomy that immigration raids possess as administrative searches by requiring Fourth
Amendment rules to be followed); see also David B. Thronson, Creating
Crisis: Immigration Raids and the Destabilization of Immigrant Families, 43 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 391, 417–18 (arguing for greater scrutiny of immigration raids in order to protect the
sanctity of homes and families). ICE’s other current programs include the "Border
Enforcement Security Task Force" which "[i]nvestigate[s] and dismantle[s] transnational
criminal enterprises at U.S. borders and key seaports" as well as the "Secure Communities"
program which "[f]ocuses federal resources on assisting local communities by identifying
and removing high-risk criminal aliens." U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
TOPICS OF INTEREST: PROGRAMS (2010), http://www.ice.gov/pi/topics/index.htm (providing
a list of ICE’s "key programs and initiatives") (last visited Oct. 12, 2010) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
145. See Katherine Evans, The Ice Storm in U.S. Homes: An Urgent Call for Policy
Change, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 561, 565 (commenting that ICE has
"dramatically expanded its interior immigration enforcement efforts" including thousands of
home raids).
146. See Parra-Chico, supra note 136, at 324–30 (describing the "blurring of lines of
authority between federal and local law enforcement of both criminal and civil immigration
laws").
147. See id. at 327–30 (observing that state and local law enforcement now have access
to federal immigration agency information through national databases).
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B. Removal Hearings

The respondent will then proceed to a removal hearing at one of the
federal immigration courts throughout the country.148 These administrative
courts conduct civil hearings within the Department of Justice and are the
main judicial component of the immigration structure.149 The precise
procedure of the hearing itself and the burden of proof will depend on the
charge brought against the respondent.150 Despite their resemblance to
ordinary criminal trials and the dire consequences of a finding of
removability,151 these hearings operate rather informally.152
The
immigration judge plays an active role in the proceedings along with the
government prosecutor: "[T]he immigration judge can and will jump in at
any time and ask questions of his or her own; some judges are known to
take away examination entirely from counsel."153 Moreover, the rights
148. See generally OFFICE OF P LANNING, ANALYSIS, & TECHNOLOGY, FY 2009
STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK (2010) B1–R3, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fy09syb.pdf
(offering a synopsis of the Immigration Courts during 2009, including statistics on the types
of cases heard and the rate of processing). Prior to the actual hearing, the respondent may
accept the charges and agree to voluntarily depart from the country. Immigration and
Nationality Act, § 240B, 8 U.S.C. § 1229 (2006).
149. See Family, supra note 129, at 598–604 (providing an outline of the general
procedures and problems contained within Immigration Courts, which generally are the
authorities who decide "whether the government will remove a foreign national from the
United States").
150. See Mary E. Kramer, Practicing Before the Immigration Court: Crimes and Other
Grounds of Removal and Application for Relief, SL010 ALI-ABA 239, 243 (2006)
(commenting that generally the burden of proof of admissibility will be on the noncitizen
who has entered or attempted to enter the country "without inspection," but that the
government will carry the burden of proof of inadmissibility for noncitizens who were
inspected upon entry). A deportable alien trying to avoid removal may seek several forms of
relief, such as voluntary departure, cancellation of removal, adjustment of status, asylum,
withholding of removal, and waiver. Id. at 267–80 (listing the many possibilities for relief
from deportation).
151. See Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922) (remarking that deportation
"may result also in loss of both property and life; or of all that makes life worth living"). See
also Stumpf, supra note 142, at 1690–93 (critiquing the lack of availability of other penalties
in the context of immigration, and decrying the lack of proportionality of deportation to the
"crimes" of immigration).
152. See Michael Kaufman, Detention, Due Process, and the Right to Counsel in
Removal Proceedings, 4 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 113, 117–20 ("The merits
hearing ‘generally conforms to the familiar adversarial model,’ albeit without many of the
procedural protections present in criminal trials.").
153. Kramer, supra note 150, at 245. See also Veena Reddy, Judicial Review of Final
Orders of Removal in the Wake of the REAL ID Act, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 557, 566 (2008)
(commenting on the affirmative duty of Immigration Judges to develop a factual record on
which to base their final decision).
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afforded to the respondent in this civil hearing resemble only a skeletal
version of the due process procedures that characterize the average criminal
trial.154 The respondent’s ability to post bond depends entirely on the
charge entered by the federal agency.155 Currently there is no comparable
right to counsel, although respondents may furnish counsel at their own
expense. 156 The Federal Rules of Evidence do not strictly apply157 and
there is only a restricted right of confrontation. Finally, the opportunity for
review of an immigration judge’s final decision is constrained both by
statute and the practical realities of an overburdened court system.158
Following the immigration judge’s decision, both the respondents as
well as the government may appeal administratively to the Board of
Immigration Appeals.159 The BIA, also within the Department of Justice
154. See Evelyn H. Cruz, Double the Injustice, Twice the Harm: The Impact of the
Board of Immigration Appeal’s Summary Affirmance Procedures, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV.
481, 485–86 (attempting to explain the unclear due process rights of noncitizen respondents
in deportation hearings). "[T]he Supreme Court has been deferential to the legislative and
executive branches in deciding immigration policy questions . . . . The Court has never
provided a definitive answer to the question of which constitutional rights outweigh plenary
power. Rather, it has addressed different scenarios under which it has given some, little, or
no protection to immigrants under the Constitution." Id.
155. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 236(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2006). See also 8
C.F.R. §§ 103.1(j), 287.5(c) (2007); 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d)(1) (2007) (providing that for
respondents who are not statutorily barred from release on bond, the decision is made by
ICE prosecutors and only involves immigration judges if the respondent seeks review).
156. See Immigration and Nationality Act, § 292, 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2006) ("In any
removal proceedings before an immigration judge . . . the person concerned shall have the
privilege of being represented (at no expense to the Government) by such counsel,
authorized to practice in such proceedings, as he shall choose."). See also Kaufman, supra
note 152, at 124–30 (claiming that beyond the lack of appointed counsel, procedural barriers
often prevent respondents’ counsel from providing full representation).
157. See Kramer, supra note 150, at 244 ("Anything which is relevant is admissible in
immigration court. However, most courts do have Local Rules, which govern the filing of
motions, exhibits, and applications.").
158. See generally Shruti Rana, "Streamlining" the Rule of Law: How the Department
of Justice is Undermining Judicial Review of Agency Action, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 829, 859–
64 (2009) (describing the efforts of executive branch officials to minimize the role of
immigration adjudications by supposedly increasing efficiency through abbreviated
processes). See also Benson, Paper Dolls, supra note 30, at 41–43 (remarking on
Congress’s recent efforts "to reduce the quantity and quality of judicial review of
administrative removal orders" but whose "net effect was a multiplication of levels and
forms of judicial review").
159. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (2008). The board’s appellate jurisdiction covers essentially the
entire scope of the decisions made by immigration judges, including orders of exclusion and
deportation. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b) (2008). Notably, either party to the original proceeding,
either the respondent or the government, may seek BIA appeal of an immigration judge’s
decision. 8 C.F.R. 1003.3(a) (2002).
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and under the close supervision of the Attorney General,160 receives the full
record of the case upon which to conduct its review.161 The BIA cannot
undertake de novo review of the facts as established by the immigration
judge, and applies instead the highly deferential "clearly erroneous"
standard.162 Moreover, the BIA is clearly barred from establishing any
factual findings not stated by the immigration judge, and must instead
remand the decision to the immigration judge where further factual
conclusions are needed.163 Questions of law and other discretionary
matters, however, may be reviewed de novo.164 "The Board’s decisions are
binding on [the] immigration judges, and precedential decisions are binding
on the [Department of Justice] and immigration judges in all proceedings
involving the same issue."165
The BIA, now reaching its seventieth year of operation, has recently
been subject to regulatory "streamlining" efforts which alter the basic
appeals process and actually interfere with the judicial integrity necessary
to impart an honest review.166 For much of its history, the BIA heard
160. See Reddy, supra note 153, at 565–66 n.57 ("Like Immigration Courts, the BIA is
part of the Department of Justice, subject to the general supervision of the Executive Office
for Immigration Review (EOIR) of the [Department of Justice], and its attorneys are
appointed by the Attorney General."). Nevertheless, the BIA has slowly gained
independence from the enforcement arm of immigration since its inception in the 1940s, and
though it is not completely independent today, the trend has been to sever it from the
Attorney General and the enforcement arm of immigration policy. See Durham, supra note
44, at 682 (observing that a common thread between all of the changes to the BIA during its
history are "measures which seek to create deeper separation between the judge and
prosecutor").
161. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.3 (2002). See Rana, supra note 158, at 843 (listing the various
documents that the BIA will include in its review, including "transcripts of testimony,
exhibits, briefs submitted by the parties, and the written decision of the immigration judge").
162. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i).
163. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(iv). "Except for taking administrative notice of
commonly known facts such as current events or the contents of official documents, the
Board will not engage in fact finding in the course of deciding appeals. A party asserting
that the Board cannot properly resolve an appeal without further fact finding must file a
motion for remand. If further fact finding is needed in a particular case, the Board may
remand the proceeding to the immigration judge or, as appropriate, to the Service." Id.
164. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii).
165. Rana, supra note 158, at 843 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g)).
166. See generally id. (presenting a comprehensive evaluation of the streamlining
efforts and their detrimental effect on judicial review of immigration enforcement actions).
The BIA’s procedures and the Board itself are wholly dependent on agency-issued
regulations, and thus the Attorney General has unfettered authority to alter every aspect of
the BIA. Id. at 843 (noting that the BIA, which is the "nation’s chief administrative body for
immigration law," nevertheless exists "only by virtue of the regulations established by the
Attorney General").
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appeals in three-member panels and issued written decisions.167 In 1999,
however, special allowances were made for occasional decisions by a single
member of the Board in order to process a growing number of appeals.168
The subsequent Attorney General intensified the trend towards less judicial
review despite improvements in the Board’s efficiency, and essentially
made the special streamlined processes the norm.169 A single member of
the BIA can now affirm an immigration judge’s decision without any
written opinion, while overturning an immigration court decision still
requires a written decision.170 At the same time, tighter deadlines were
required for the BIA, thereby increasing the average Board member’s
caseload to 4,000 appeals a year.171 Finally, the number of members on the
BIA has been reduced from twenty-three members to currently fourteen
members.172 The effects of this streamlining effort have been to actually
increase appeals and provoke harsh criticism from federal judges.173
167. Executive Office for Immigration Review; Board of Immigration Appeals:
Streamlining, 64 Fed. Reg. 56, 135-01 (Oct. 18, 1999) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 1003).
168. See Durham, supra note 44, at 682 (commenting that the initial use of the
streamlined procedures was used only when "certain conditions were met" but that "more
than fifty percent of the cases received by the Board were assigned for decision by a single
member for summary affirmance").
169. See id. at 682–83 (attacking the increased streamlined procedures as efforts to
minimalize immigration adjudications under the guise of making the hearings more
efficient). "During the same period, Attorney General [John] Ashcroft also used his
statutory authority to vacate precedent decisions of the Board and issue new and binding
decisions himself." Id. at 683.
170. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(e)(4)(i), (ii). See Rana, supra note 158, at 846–49 (arguing
that the allowance for single-member affirmance without a written element significantly
lessens the effectiveness of the BIA).
171. See id. at 833 (remarking that with the allowances for single-member decisions
and the increased caseload, "Board members could spend no more than a few minutes on
each case").
172. See Durham, supra note 44, at 683 (explaining the questionable plan to increase
the BIA’s effectiveness in deciding cases as well as its ability to remove its backlog by
cutting the number of board members in half). The dubious motivations of the reduction of
the BIA’s size was further suggested by later revelations that those board members chosen to
be removed "were those with essentially the most immigrant-friendly and anti-agency
decision record on precedent cases." Id. (citing Peter J. Levinson, The Façade of QuasiJudicial Independence in Immigration Appellate Adjudications, 9 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL.
1154, 1155–61 (2004)).
173. See generally John R.B. Palmer, Stephen W. Yale-Loehr & Elizabeth Cronin, Why
Are So Many People Challenging Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions in Federal
Court? An Empirical Analysis of the Recent Surge in Petitions for Review, 20 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 1, 43–51 (2005) (providing a broad analysis of the large considerable increase in the
number of petitions for review for both the BIA and the federal courts of appeals, concluding
that a number of factors have contributed including the revamped policies and procedures of
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C. Current Role of Article III Courts in Reviewing Removal Decisions
Once the respondent exhausts all available administrative remedies
with a final decision by the BIA, the respondent facing removal may
attempt to seek review of the final removal decision at the federal court of
appeals in the geographically appropriate circuit court.174 Under RIDA, this
appeal absolutely must be submitted within thirty days of the BIA’s final
order, and failure to do so forecloses any chance of further review.175 The
high threshold issue for every appeal is establishing the court’s jurisdiction,
which under the language of the RIDA requires usually either a
"constitutional claim" or a "question of law." 176 Though courts have
understood this to bar all review of discretionary and factual
determinations, they have not agreed beyond that, as the courts recognize
that Congress intended to severely limit their jurisdiction but are hesitant to
Unsurprisingly, the
read the language as strongly as it is worded.177
confusion has engendered a circuit split, and thus despite the supposed
uniformity of federal immigration law,178 respondents will face different
standards of review jurisdiction depending on where their removal hearing
took place.179

the BIA). The authors also posit that there has been a shift in the willingness of immigration
lawyers and their clients to utilize judicial review as a means to challenge, perhaps even
delay, final orders from the Department of Justice. Id. at 85–93.
174. 8 U.S.C. § 1252. The statute clearly states that the federal courts of appeals are
generally the only means available of acquiring any type of review once the Department of
Justice has completed its adjudications under an immigration judge and the BIA. 8 U.S.C. §
1252(a)(5).
175. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1).
176. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). See also Seipp, supra note 57, at 1 (commenting that
"[e]ven if the practitioner does not address the jurisdictional issue in the initial briefing of
the case, he or she must be prepared to respond to the inevitable ‘lack of jurisdiction’
arguments advanced by the government or raised by the court sua sponte").
177. See Moore, supra note 46, at 2047–51 (observing that although there are
categories of decisions which are clearly factual or discretionary in nature, the courts have
not been uniform in exactly what that dividing line is between the two); Reddy, supra note
153, at 577–79 ("The inability of appellate courts to determine clearly those discretionary
judgments that fall within the category of a "question of law" has not only produced
inconsistent results among circuit courts in relief from removal cases, but has also limited
the degree of judicial review over removal decisions.").
178. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 ("The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o establish
a uniform Rule of Naturalization.").
179. See Reddy, supra note 153, at 579–91 (describing the variance between different
federal circuits in allowing certain evidentiary and credibility findings by the court of
appeal).
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III. Immigration Reform
A. The One Agreement in Immigration Reform
From a much larger perspective, immigration reform is greatly needed
simply to come to terms with immigration in the modern era and the
realities of undocumented immigration.180 As stated by one legal scholar,
"[t]he American immigration regime is surreal. Twelve million human
beings live out their lives in the United States—own property, raise
children, pay taxes—in the absence of formal legal status."181 The current
structure of immigration law created at the middle of the twentieth century
remains in place, both in spirit through the preference-based system of the
1965 Amendments182 and in fact through the continuing use of the INA as
the framework of immigration law, but widespread uncertainty continues as
to the functional details of that structure. 183 Ongoing debate and proposed
legislation touches on every facet of immigration, including admissions
standards, enforcement practices, the function of the courts, and detention
practices.184 Despite the occasional contentiousness over the particulars,
180. See generally James A.R. Nafziger, Immigration and Immigration Law After
9/11: Getting It Straight, 37 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 555, 562–66 (2009) (cataloguing the
facts and studies on immigration in recent years and confirming that legislative reform is
vital to restore the operability of immigration to the U.S.). See also Lucas Guttentag,
Immigration Reform: A Civil Rights Issue, 3 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 157, 158–
63 (2007) (emphasizing the continuing importance of civil rights and judicial review as
central considerations of immigration reform); Stacy McCland, Immigration Reform and
Agriculture: What We Really Want, What We Really Need, and What Will Happen If They
Leave?, 10 BARRY L. REV. 63, 78–79 (2008) (advocating for a candid evaluation of the U.S.
agricultural industry’s dependence on immigrant labor and a legal recognition of this
reliance).
181. Daniel Ibsen Morales, In Democracy’s Shadow: Fences, Raids, and the
Production of Migrant Illegality, 5 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 23, 25 (2009).
Despite this extraordinary situation, the author argues that the "criminalization strategy
[which labels all undocumented immigrants as criminals] is now firmly entrenched and
impossible to dislodge. Until Congress manages a normalization, ‘illegal’ migrants will
suffer from both the social and legal marginalization that their stigma confers." Id. at 72.
182. See Motomura, supra note 37, at 1936–38 (describing the lasting effect that the
"nondiscrimination principles" of the 1965 Amendments have had on immigration policy).
In effect, the 1965 Amendments "marked the full adoption of a basic nondiscrimination
principle in American immigration law." Id. at 1935.
183. See Vaughns, supra note 17, at 167–71 (comparing the outwardly vigorous
immigration enforcement laws with the irregular and sometimes lenient application of those
laws); Nafziger, supra note 180, at 562 ("Public opinion, though consistently supportive of
immigrants, fluctuates cyclically . . . [and] Congress has typically responded . . . in cycles of
liberality and restriction.").
184. See Nafziger, supra note 180, at 561–62 (observing that public opinion
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"all observers of immigration policies agree that current system is broken
and in desperate need of repair."185
B. Why Reform Should Include Immigration Adjudications Generally
Criticism towards immigration courts has come both from legal
scholars as well as federal judges, decrying the direction in which
immigration adjudications have been taken in terms of isolation from
judicial review.186 On a theoretical level, judicial review stands as a
hallmark of the overall judicial system and notions of justice.187
Unambiguous efforts to isolate the immigration courts from the federal
judiciary cut against this principle, and though precedent allows
Congress to control the form and function of immigration adjudication,
it is clear that immigration adjudication has departed from the standard
procedural safeguards of our judicial processes.188 This also contrasts
with an immigration system whose underlying premises tend towards
surrounding immigration and potential reform has intensified regarding all aspects of
immigration, especially after the attacks of September 11th, 2001, and this has hindered the
progress of reform). Despite efforts for comprehensive legislation to confront the many
issues plaguing immigration, there has only been a patchwork of developments which have
primarily restricted immigration into the country, penalized immigrants within the country,
and added criminal elements to immigration. Id. at 562–63.
185. Vaughns, supra note 17, at 151. Compare Lucas Guttentag, Immigration and
American Values: Some Initial Steps for a New Administration, HUM. RTS. MAG., Fall 2008,
at 10 ("Major legislation to restore fairness, credibility, and accountability is essential."),
with Asa Hutchinson, Holes in the Fence: Immigration Reform and Border Security in the
United States, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 533, 536 (2007) ("The rule of law must prevail . . . [and]
we must concentrate on the security side, the enforcement side, the side of integrity.").
186. See Rana, supra note 158, at 834 (explaining that recent changes to immigration
adjudication have led to more appeals to the Courts of Appeals, and "courts in every circuit
[in 2006] began issuing scathing critiques of the quality of the agency’s decision making and
the lacks of its adherence to basic principles of the rules of law").
187. See, e.g., id. at 839 (noting that external judicial review "has customarily served
the function of ensuring that an agency is complying with its own regulations while carrying
out congressional intent"). The author adds that the importance of judicial review is
magnified in the context of immigration removal hearings due to the highly punitive nature
of deportation. Id.
188. See Rana, supra note 158, at 859–64 (describing the effect that RIDA and
streamlining have had on appellate court review of immigration matters as having
"surreptitiously expanded the zone of untouchable agency decision making"); Stephen H.
Legomsky, Fear and Loathing in Congress and the Courts: Immigration and Judicial
Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1615, 1630–31 (2000) (suggesting that limits on judicial review in
the realm of immigration adjudications risk a loss of independence from enforcement and a
loss of the courts of appeals’ more diverse experience on which to base its analysis).
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fairness.189 Admittedly, the legislation of 1961 and 1965 were created in
different circumstances, especially in terms of the undocumented
population, yet their principles should continue to apply.
From a practical standpoint, limited judicial review also produces
questionable legal proceedings. Federal judges have candidly critiqued
immigration court decisions that have come before them on review,
disparaging the lack of quality that they must contend with on review.190
Administrative courts are under Congress’s control and located within
the executive branch, yet they still are part of the U.S. court system and
thus should conform to its high standards. Furthermore, given the recent
streamlining changes to the Immigration Court adjudications, the risk of
injustice arguably has increased.191 In fact, the streamlining efforts
themselves may even have helped increase petitions for review from the
BIA.192 Though Congress and the Department of Justice have made
their position on their unreviewability clear, it is not in the nature of the
U.S. federal government to exclude a branch from the normal functions
of government.
Certainly the measures taken to streamline the immigration
adjudications are not wholly without merit, and the advantages offered
must be acknowledged. Without challenging long-standing precedent,
Congress has essentially unrestrained control over all facets of
immigration and naturalization, thus making judicial review a policy

189. See H.R. Rep. 87-1086, pt. 2, at 2968 (1961) (recognizing that aliens seeking
review of administrative orders should be given a full and fair opportunity to do so). See
also supra Part D (establishing the foundation for the 1965 Amendments, which included
recognizing the inevitable need for judicial review and the embrace of racial fairness).
190. See, e.g., Benslimane v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 828, 830 (7th Cir. 2005)
("[A]djudication of [immigration] cases at the administrative level has fallen below the
minimum standards of legal justice."). Written by Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh
Circuit, the opinion also stated that "it cannot be in the interest of the immigration
authorities, the taxpayer, the federal judiciary, or citizens concerned with the effective
enforcement of the nation’s immigration laws for removal orders to be routinely nullified by
the courts . . . ." Id.
191. See Rana, supra note 158, at 859–64 (observing that the combined effect of RIDA
and streamlined adjudication procedures have meant that reviewing courts of appeals often
have less information on which to base their analysis).
192. See Palmer, Yale-Loehr & Cronin, supra note 173, at 29–32 (concluding that the
streamlining procedures prompted respondents in immigration hearings to seek external
review as the administrative appeals process left them unsatisfied). The authors also note
that the Department of Justice has taken the counter-position "that people are appealing BIA
decisions at a higher rate simply to delay being expelled in the face of more prompt BIA
decisions." Id. at 31.
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question as opposed to a legal question.193 Curtailing judicial review
also conserves judicial resources and accelerates immigration
removals.194 Nevertheless, the immigration system still forms part of
our national policy, and should not be excused from either the principles
underlying both our national standards of justice and the modern
immigration system.
C. Why Reform Should Specifically Include Habeas Corpus
"[A] serious Suspension Clause issue would arise if the 1996
statutes have withdrawn that power [to issue a writ of habeas corpus]
from federal judges and provided no adequate substitute."195 So wrote
the St. Cyr Supreme Court in 2001, finding that Congress had not clearly
removed habeas corpus review in the immigration context.196 Thus the
question now becomes if Congress followed those instructions when it
passed the jurisdiction-stripping RIDA in 2005 and provided an
adequate substitute.197 This Note contends that Congress failed to do
this judged by recent developments in habeas corpus law, and that
Congress should return to long-held principles still contained within the
immigration system and fully restore the respondent’s right to seek a
petition of habeas corpus.
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Boumediene v. Bush198
established what had long been lacking in habeas corpus
193. See supra Part IA (discussing the plenary power of Congress over immigration
policy).
194. See Moore, supra note 46, at 2059–60 (proposing that the main argument for
limitations on judicial review in immigration adjudications is the conservation of judicial
resources and the acceleration of immigration enforcement operations).
195. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 290 (2001).
196. See id. at 314 (concluding that "the absence of such a forum [to provide adequate
habeas review], coupled with the lack of a clear, unambiguous, and express statement of
congressional intent to preclude judicial consideration" indicates that Congress had not
removed habeas corpus review for any immigration respondents).
197. See Norako, supra note 124 (arguing that RIDA was Congress’s direct answer to
the St. Cyr case, and was thus crafted with the St. Cyr’s decision in mind).
198. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 777–87 (2008) (finding that the reach of
the Constitution includes militant detainees held at an overseas military compound and that
the detainees therefore possessed the right to petition for habeas corpus review). In
Boumediene, the Court considered whether the Military Commissions Act of 2006 forbade
federal courts from considering writs of habeas corpus. Id. at 735–36. Because the
Suspension Clause of the Constitution applied to the Military Commissions Act, the Court
looked to determine whether Congress had provided petitioners with an adequate substitute
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jurisprudence: a definition.199
In so doing, the Court therefore
promulgated the closest approximation to a bright-line rule for
determining what is required for a habeas corpus substitute.200 Writing
for the majority, Justice Kennedy explained that the availability of the
writ is not static but accommodates each particular circumstance.201 At
a minimum, it requires "a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate that he
is being held pursuant to ‘the erroneous application or interpretation’ of
relevant law."202 The Court added that where the detention comes as a
result of executive detention, and thus without the procedural guarantees
inherent to a full court trial, habeas review takes on an even more
important role.203
In the words of the Court: "Habeas corpus
proceedings need not resemble a criminal trial, even when the detention
is by executive order. But the writ must be effective. The habeas court
must have sufficient authority to conduct a meaningful review of both
the cause for detention and the Executive’s power to detain."204
Applying this standard to RIDA, the law simply does not suffice.
The relevant language of RIDA, "constitutional claims and questions of
law," appears at first glance to meet the requirements, as it grants
jurisdiction for legal attacks on detention.205 The Boumediene Court,
however, did not simply require that there be an allowance for review;
for the habeas writ. Id. at 765–71. The Court determined that the Detainee Treatment Act
of 2005 did not provide adequate substitute for the habeas writ. Id. at 784–94.
199. See Norako, supra note 124, at 1617–18 ("Despite the significance of the writ,
courts have struggled in defining its exact scope and purpose."). The writ of habeas corpus
was largely only defined as a means to challenge executive detention, but remained unclear
on the specific requirements for such a challenge. Id. "Our case law does not contain
extensive discussion of standards defining suspension of the writ or of circumstances under
which suspension has occurred." Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 772–73.
200. Id. at 1626–28 (describing the vague contours established by the Boumediene
Court in setting out what constitutes sufficient habeas review, noting that the determination
is highly case-sensitive).
201. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 778–79 (describing "common-law habeas corpus" as
"an adaptable remedy [whose] precise application and scope changed depending upon the
circumstances").
202. Id. at 2266 (emphasis added).
203. Id. at 783 (realizing that executive detention is not as constrained as criminal
detention is by limits on duration and requirements of procedure; thus, greater checks are
required in order to protect the detainee).
204. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 783 (2008) (emphasis added).
205. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) ("Nothing in subparagraph (B) or (C), or in any
other provision of this chapter . . . which limits or eliminates judicial review, shall be
construed as precluding review of constitutional claims or questions of law . . . ." (emphasis
added)).
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instead, the Court characterized this review as "effective" and
"meaningful."206 It is these heightened standards which disqualify the
judicial review under RIDA from being a sufficient replacement for
habeas corpus review.207 First of all, the court of appeals judge must
depend on the administrative record for all factual determinations, and
has very limited ability to either reconsider such factual findings or
accept new evidence from the respondent.208 Second, the strict thirtyday time limit placed on appeals risks the right to habeas corpus review,
as the detained respondent must receive the final order, obtain the
assistance of a lawyer, and that lawyer must file the writ, all within
thirty days.209 Finally, one of the effects of the recent streamlining
procedures has been the rise of single-member affirmations without a
written opinion.210 Such a procedure leaves a reviewing judge with less
to consider and obscures the reasoning of the immigration courts as well
as the BIA.211 The provisions for judicial review contained within RIDA
fail to meet the requirements for habeas corpus review as explained by
the Boumediene Court, as the reviewing judge’s analysis is limited to an
ambiguous record which can only be challenged during the first thirty
days of detention.
Since evidentiary errors, subsequent factual
developments, and prolonged detention should form part of an effective
and meaningful habeas review, congressional action is required to
amend this disparity.

206. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 783.
207. See Norako, supra note 124, at 1640–47 (presenting argument against the
sufficiency of RIDA as valid replacement for writ of habeas corpus).
208. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(b)(4)(A), (B). See Norako, supra note 124, at 1640–44
(contending that the general inability of a reviewing court to modify or supplement the
evidence precludes the judge from providing a meaningful review).
209. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1). See Norako, supra note 124, at 1644–47 (suggesting that
such a short time-frame easily causes unfair results where the respondent is the innocent
victim of delayed decisions and deliveries of final orders).
210. See Durham, supra note 44, at 659–60 (commenting that "appeals are now
routinely heard by single members" and that there has been a "proliferation of ‘affirmance
without opinion’ decisions"). See also supra Part III.B (explaining the origins and process
of the streamlining efforts and reduced involvement of the BIA).
211. See Rana, supra note 158, at 849 (explaining that the streamlining procedures
often prevents a reviewing court of appeals from understanding the BIA’s ground for
summary affirmance, thus leaving the court of appeals only with the record from the
immigration judge).
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IV. Larger Examination of What is Needed for Reform—Looking
Backwards and Forwards
A. Immigration Reform Must Consider Immigration Broadly
Immigration reform must take into evaluation the current
circumstances and current laws and regulations in order to best decide
what to do next. However, the current legal structure rests squarely on a
history of civil liberties that first became clearly apparent with the
Immigration Act of 1965 and the political and social developments of
that time.212 Immigration reform therefore is not simply a matter of
economic arguments and population numbers. There are broader policy
considerations that also form part of our national rhetoric.213 Though
historically our immigration policy has not been viewed as constrained
by the language of our Constitution,214 constitutional principles should
form part of our consideration.215 These were the impulses that drove
212. See Monhollon, supra note 79, at 286–87 ("During the Sixties era, the federal
government acted decisively to create national standards of justice that greatly expanded
legal protections for racial and ethnic minorities and for women."). However, these
developments are certainly not the final declaration on civil rights—"[a]s in the 1960s,
Americans continue to debate the limits of individual liberty, community rights, the rights of
minorities, and the use of public versus private power to make the United States a just
society." Id.
213. See Owen Fiss, The Immigrant as Pariah, in A COMMUNITY OF EQUALS 3, 19–21
(Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers eds., 1999) ("The social disabilities [levied against
immigrants] are unconstitutional because they create a social structure that is inconsistent
with the conception of community embodied in the Constitution."). The author draws a clear
distinction between social disabilities, which consist of limits on the basic elements of
participation in a civic community such as housing, employment, and basic necessities, and
political disabilities, which consist of limits on the involvement in the organization and
control of that community. Id. at 4–7. He then concludes that the Constitution contains an
"antisubjugation principle," embodied in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, which
directs the United States to not "subjugate immigrants, not because we owe them anything,
but to preserve our society as a community of equals." Id. at 17.
214. See NEUMAN, supra note 19, at 119–34 (arguing that the fundamental powers of
the United States as a sovereign and under the Constitution do not provide conclusively the
ability to exclude migrants from its territory, but that universal individual rights, including
the freedom of movement, provide at least a narrow right of access to the country).
215. See Robin West, A Moral Responsibility, in A COMMUNITY OF EQUALS 63, 66–67
(Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers eds., 1999) (furthering the belief that, in addition to the
Courts, "the [American] people and their representatives" possess an obligation mandated by
the Constitution to not subjugate immigrants socially). The author describes the
Constitution as "the expression and embodiment of our egalitarian and communitarian better
selves: it presents and imposes our defining conception of social justice—at once liberal
egalitarian, respectful of individuals and mindful or our communitarian natures—and it
embodies, expresses, and enforces our political morality." Id.
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reform in the 1960s and which continue to be interwoven in our
immigration policy, but which have since receded as reform debates
have focused single-mindedly on discrete sections of immigration
policy.216
The abandonment in 1965 of the national origins system in favor of
a system designed to reunite families and recognize skilled or otherwise
valuable immigrants was a decision that has had enormous ramifications
for the contemporary United States.217 Statistical evidence suggests that
the new system triggered a surge of immigration, and for the last three
decades political reactions have attempted to alleviate the effects of this
shift through legislative changes.218 In attempting to modify the
immigration system, however, these new laws have reached too far,
challenging the very ideals that pushed the country towards a
preference-based system half a century ago. This departure is evidenced
by the ever-tightening restrictions on judicial review, most recently the
elimination of full habeas corpus review for removal orders.219 In
addition to a commitment to these enduring principles, the benefits of
judicial involvement should not be underestimated, and an evaluation of
the transformations that took place in criminal procedure in the 1960s
provides an explanation for this.
B. Criminal Procedure Revolution
The same era that produced the 1961 and 1965 Amendments also
gave rise to the famed, if not infamous, "criminal procedure
216. See KANSTROOM, supra note 12, at 226 (describing the current immigration
scheme as "an exceptionally rigid legal regime . . . riven with discretionary executive
authority, and increasingly immune from meaningful oversight"); Boswell, supra note 33, at
332 ("[T]he 1965 Amendments were regarded as groundbreaking because the legislation
dismantled a legacy of discriminatory immigration policy [yet] . . . [i]n retrospect, it appears
that the 1965 Amendments have been the last positive immigration reform of the twentieth
century.").
217. See BRIGGS, supra note 35, at 112–16 (explaining the policy behind the
Immigration Act of 1965 and its effect on immigration policy).
218. See id. at 118–89 (providing a comprehensive overview of developments
subsequent to the 1965 Amendments, including the ramp-up of immigration numerically,
increased global political issues involving immigration, and culminating in the increasingly
complex issue of undocumented immigration).
219. See supra Parts II.C, III.C (discussing, respectively, the effect of RIDA on habeas
corpus and the questionable constitutionality of RIDA in removing habeas review without
providing a sufficient replacement).
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revolution" (Revolution), accomplished by the U.S. Supreme Court
under Chief Justice Earl Warren.220 Though the transformations in
both immigration and criminal procedure can be traced to
developments predating the social movements of the 1960s, both also
are inextricably linked to this remarkable decade.221 And though the
Revolution is a consortium of "hundreds of criminal procedure cases"
whereas the 1961 and 1965 Amendments are simply two instances of
federal legislation,222 the policy choices reflected in each share a
common foundation in the broader political advances of the 1960s. 223
The Revolution represented an influential turning point in
criminal procedure law that continues to have an important impact on
the daily functions of the U.S. criminal system.224 These relatively
rapid changes to criminal procedure law were strongly criticized by
some at the time and arguably even swayed major elections,225 and
some of the major components, such as the evidential exclusionary
rule, remain controversial.226 Yet, the enduring nature of many of the
220. See, e.g., MELVIN I. UROFSKY, THE WARREN COURT: JUSTICES, RULINGS, AND
LEGACY 157 (2001) (describing the two main goals of the Warren Court in the area of
criminal procedure as ensuring basic procedures for all citizens regardless of resources and
applying the "spirit" of the Constitution instead of the "wording"). But see JOHN DENTON
CARTER, THE WARREN COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION: A CRITICAL VIEW OF JUDICIAL
ACTIVISM 112–20 (1973) (criticizing the Warren Court’s judicial philosophy as incorrectly
being interpreted to favor only a small segment of the population).
221. See LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 446
(2000) (drawing a political connection between the Revolution and the concurrent effort to
confront poverty and other systemic problems stemming from race); see also BRIGGS, supra
note 35, at 106–07 (arguing that the Civil Rights Act fostered the political climate necessary
for immigration reform).
222. Corinna Barrett Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the Warren
Court’s Role in the Criminal Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1361, 1365 (2004).
223. See A. Kenneth Pye, The Warren Court and Criminal Procedure, in THE WARREN
COURT: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 58, 65 (Richard H. Sayler et al. eds., 1968) (noting that the
Revolution is best comprehended by evaluating it in the context of the broader civil rights
movement); see also BRIGGS, supra note 35, at 106–07 (observing that the principles
prohibiting racial discrimination against citizens logically led to prohibiting racial
discrimination in national immirgration policy).
224. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST
PRINCIPLES 146–47 (1997) (referring to the Warren Court’s rulings in criminal procedure as
"a remarkable edifice of Fourth Amendment, Fifth Amendment, and Sixth Amendment
rules" as well as "the foundations of modern constitutional criminal procedure").
225. See ED CRAY, CHIEF JUSTICE: A BIOGRAPHY OF EARL WARREN 497–500 (1997)
(noting that during the 1968 presidential campaign, Richard Nixon unequivocally and
successfully ran against the criminal procedure rulings of the Warren Court, claiming that
the Warren Court "weakened law and encouraged criminals").
226. See THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND
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practices promoted by the Warren Court indicates their permanence in
the legal system, as some of the obligatory procedures have since
become deeply ingrained in police and judicial operations across the
nation.227 This regularity has in turn fostered greater confidence in the
court system to produce fair results.228 Furthermore, a general public
acceptance of these constitutional judgments suggests a common
acknowledgement of their reasoning.229 The reliance on the Bill of
Rights resonates with a common understanding of the relationship
between the individual and the government.230
In comparison to the ongoing uncertainty of immigration law, the
Revolution presents a relatively stable authority. It is this degree of
stability that offers guidance for potential immigration reform,
especially regarding the benefits of judicial involvement. If such
reform can achieve results comparable to those of the Revolution, then
immigration law may finally achieve the steadiness that it has long
been lacking. The most effective manner in which to accomplish this
is a return to the policies that shaped immigration legislation in the
1960s, including a restoration of judicial review to its former levels.

INTERPRETATION 609–12 (2008) (explaining the basic shape of the current exclusionary rule
but noting that there are continued calls to remove the exclusionary rule in place of remedies
less harsh towards law enforcement); WILLIAM T. PIZZI, TRIALS WITHOUT TRUTH: WHY OUR
SYSTEM OF CRIMINAL TRIALS HAS BECOME AN EXPENSIVE FAILURE AND WHAT WE NEED TO
DO TO REBUILD IT 33–45 (1999) (arguing that the exclusionary rule harmfully imports the
antagonism of the courtroom into the practices of police enforcement, and that courts should
be more flexible in allowing evidence).
227. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda’s Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and
Vanishingly Small Social Costs, in THE MIRANDA DEBATE: LAW, JUSTICE, AND POLICING
191, 191–95 (Richard A. Leo & George C. Thomas III eds., 1998) (arguing that the Miranda
warnings enjoy "acceptance across a broad spectrum" and that police officers have both
adopted the warnings and adapted to them).
228. See JOHN F. DECKER, REVOLUTION TO THE RIGHT: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
JURISPRUDENCE DURING THE BURGER-REHNQUIST COURT ERA 107 (1992) (characterizing the
Warren Court as emphasizing "fairness, equity, and the presumption of innocence above the
crime control model that espoused efficiency, finality, and the presumption of guilt").
229. See BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 270–77
(explaining that many of the Warren Court’s first landmark cases in criminal procedure were
viewed positively by the public, embodying "equal justice for all, the furthering of national
values against foot-dragging states, [and] the Court acting because others would not").
230. See Pye, supra note 223, at 62 (commenting on "the disparity between the reality
of the criminal process and the ideals of civilized conduct to which we as a nation had sworn
allegiance").
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i. Description of the Criminal Procedure Revolution
Prior to the Revolution’s standardization of criminal procedure,
criminal law generally was a state matter.231 Owing mainly to federalism
concerns and traditional practices, the vast majority of criminal defendants
only came into contact with state laws: "More than 99 percent of all
prosecutions were brought in the state systems. In those cases, both the
Court’s pronouncements and the Constitution were largely irrelevant." 232
Consequently, the procedures allowed to a criminal defendant depended
entirely on the state constitutions and legislatures, as the protections offered
in the Bill of Rights constrained only the federal government.233 The
passage of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 and the requirement of due
process for the states nominally gave the federal courts an instrument
through which they could ensure the most basic individual protections at
the state level.234 For decades, however, this supervision only triggered
remedial rulings where the state court disregarded the "fundamental
principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and
political institutions."235 In effect, this standard required extreme violations
by state courts to provoke the Court’s intervention, such as the unjust trial
overturned in Powell v. Alabama,236 and was administered unpredictably
through a case-by-case analysis.237
231. See MICHAL R. BELKNAP, THE SUPREME COURT UNDER EARL WARREN, 1953–1969
218–19 (2005) (describing the near-absolute control the individual states possessed over
their respective criminal laws and procedures prior to the middle of the twentieth century).
232. Id. at 218.
233. See UROFSKY, supra note 220, at 158 (noting that the Supreme Court declared in
1833 that the Bill of Rights "applied only against the federal government, and this remained
the accepted interpretation until after the Civil War").
234. See BELKNAP, supra note 231, at 218–19 (arguing that the initial interpretation of
the Fourteenth Amendment by the Supreme Court as applied to state criminal proceedings
was very loose and allowed the states great independence and flexibility).
235. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932) (quoting Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S.
312, 316 (1926)).
236. Id. (holding that Alabama’s refusal to appoint competent counsel for eight
African-American defendants tried for rape charges was a denial of due process). In Powell,
the defendants were arrested and at trial the judge "appointed all the members of the bar" to
represent the defendants. Id. at 49. A jury sentenced the defendants to death. Id. at 50. The
Court found that the attorney who finally represented Defendants had no opportunity to
prepare or investigate the case. Id. at 57–58. The Court then analyzed the history of the
right to counsel and the history of incorporating the Bill of Rights through the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 59–70. The Court held that courts must appoint counsel in capital cases
when the defendant cannot afford counsel and is incapable of a pro se defense. Id. at 71.
237. See BELKNAP, supra note 231, at 219 (explaining the unpredictability and gradual
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This adaptive process continued through the early years of the Warren
Court.238 Beginning in the mid-1950s, however, egalitarian sentiments
began to emerge in some of its rulings,239 and in 1959 the Court’s new
direction surfaced with the decision in Frank v. Maryland.240 "The
controversy ignited by [these early decisions] foreshadowed larger storms
that would swirl around the Court . . . as it labored to bring criminal
procedure in line with changes in American legal culture."241 This
alignment most clearly materialized in Mapp v. Ohio,242 in which the
exclusionary rule was brought to bear against the states by applying the
federal interpretation of the Fourth Amendment to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment.243 Although this "selective incorporation" of
constitutional rights had actually commenced decades earlier,244 it was not
process by which the Bill of Rights were applied to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment).
238. See Yale Kamisar, How Earl Warren’s Twenty-Two Years in Law Enforcement
Affected His Work as Chief Justice, in EARL WARREN AND THE WARREN COURT: THE
LEGACY IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN LAW 91, 91–92 (Harry N. Scheiber ed., 2007)
(identifying Chief Justice Warren’s preliminary outlook on criminal procedure as being
particularly affected by his personal history in law enforcement and desire to uphold high
standards).
239. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (ruling that due process requires that
any state which provides for appellate review must not discriminate against any defendant,
here for refusing to supply indigent defendants with a copy of the trial transcript); Mallory v.
U.S., 354 U.S. 449, 455–56 (1957) (holding that interrogation of a defendant for many hours
and refusing to arraign the defendant before a magistrate judge constitutes a due process
violation).
240. See Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 372–73 (1959) (holding that Baltimore
could impose a fine on its residents who resist inspection of their house by health inspectors
pursuant to a city ordinance), In Frank, a health inspector, unable to gain access to a
residence, observed unsanitary conditions and called police, who then obtained a warrant
and arrested the resident. Id. at 361–62. The Court reasoned that the need for regulation of
sanitary living conditions justified the city ordinance and that the inspection did not rise to a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. 371–72.
241. BELKNAP, supra note 231, at 226.
242. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961) (ruling that evidence must be
excluded in a state criminal case where it is the product of warrantless search). In Mapp,
police officers forced entry into a home after the resident insisted she would only open the
door for a search warrant, which the police lacked. Id. at 644. The Court reviewed the
history of the incorporation of the Fourth Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
at 650–54. Finding that the Fourth Amendment applies to the States and the Federal
Government, the Court concluded that the States are also subject to the exclusionary rule.
Id. at 654.
243. See id. at 654 (extending the exclusionary rule against the states).
244. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (declining to invalidate a state
law limiting inciting language under the First Amendment, but establishing the Fourteenth
Amendment as a method through which the Bill of Rights could apply to the states). The
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until Mapp that the Court began incorporating the federal criminal
procedural protections in earnest.245 The ruling launched an unprecedented
wave of cases that came to be known as the criminal procedure
revolution,246 including Gideon v. Wainwright,247 Miranda v. Arizona,248
Escobedo v. Illinois,249 Malloy v. Hogan,250 Katz v. United States,251 and
many others.252 "By the time Warren retired from the Supreme Court in
1969, a district attorney had to be an expert on constitutional law."253
Chief Justice Warren, himself a former state prosecutor, viewed
stricter controls on law enforcement as ultimately beneficial for their
operations.254 More important, however, "was the disparity between the
reality of the criminal process and the ideals of civilized conduct to which

Court’s precise and rather clear language concerning the applicability of the Fourteenth
Amendment against the states: "For present purposes we may and do assume that freedom
of speech and of the press—which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment
by Congress—are among the fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States." Id.
245. See BELKNAP, supra note 231, at 231 (describing the impact of Mapp as an
"incorporation breakthrough").
246. See Pye, supra note 223, at 58 (noting in the years immediately following the
Revolution that "whether these changes constitute a ‘criminal law revolution’ or merely an
orderly evolution towards the application of civilized standards to the trial of persons
accused of crime").
247. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963) (establishing the requirement
under the Sixth Amendment for a state to furnish legal counsel for certain criminal
defendants who cannot otherwise afford it).
248. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478–79 (1966) (holding that evidence
obtained from a criminal defendant through police interrogation without a full advisement of
the criminal’s rights is inadmissible under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments).
249. See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 492 (1964) (expanding the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel to include the right to have legal counsel present during police
interrogations).
250. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (holding that an individual’s Fifth
Amendment right against forced self-incrimination also protected the individual during state
criminal trials).
251. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967) (interpreting the Fourth
Amendment to protect against warrantless searches where there is a reasonable expectation
of privacy, regardless of whether there was physical intrusion).
252. See Pye, supra note 223, 58–77 (surveying the cases constituting the criminal
procedure revolution and noting the unprecedented nature of the rulings and their probable
and lasting impact).
253. BELKNAP, supra note 231, at 218.
254. See G. EDWARD WHITE, EARL WARREN: A PUBLIC LIFE 263 (1982) (describing the
strict view and high standards that Chief Justice Warren maintained towards law
enforcement personnel from his time spent in the profession in California).
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we as a nation had sworn allegiance."255 Despite the conventional
deference shown towards the states regarding criminal law, the Court now
required the states and their criminal procedure laws to meet the minimal
standards of the Constitution.256 The Revolution predictably encountered
resistance from segments of a heavily divided populace, even prompting
Congress in one instance to attempt to legislatively reverse the Court.257
For parts of the country, the Revolution formed yet another part of a series
of unsupported and destabilizing cases.258
Despite the controversy, however, the Revolution was no more than an
element of the political and social landscape of the time—"[t]he Court’s
concern with criminal procedure can be understood only in the context of
the struggle for civil rights."259 In the view of Chief Justice Warren, crime
had become urbanized and driven by poverty,260 and coupled with this was
the evident reality that minorities endured most of the illegitimate police
behavior.261 Encouraged by the national mood as well as the specific
efforts of many states to improve their criminal procedure laws, the Court
demanded judicial regularity based on the federal model for all criminals
across the nation.262 "If government was going to deprive some of its
255. Pye, supra note 223, at 62.
256. See Joseph L. Hoffman & Nancy J. King, Rethinking the Federal Role in State
Criminal Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 791, 802 (2009) (explaining that without the Supreme
Court’s "aggressive" efforts during the 1960s, "it is possible that many of the modern
reforms of state criminal justice systems would never have occurred").
257. See POWE, supra note 221, at 409–10 (describing the legally questionably efforts
by Congress in 1968 to undermine the Miranda warnings by legislatively restoring the preMiranda legal structure).
258. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 229, at 274–77 (arguing that changes in crime rates and
unrelated shifts in public opinion caused the Revolution to appear less appealing in the latter
half of the 1960s).
259. See Pye, supra note 223, at 65 (arguing that the growing consensus regarding
greater equality throughout society made criminal rights an inevitable target of reform).
260. See WHITE, supra note 254, at 264–66 (contrasting the typical criminal of the
1950s with that of the 1960s, the latter being the product of impoverished and otherwise
disadvantaged situations).
261. See Pye, supra note 223, at 65 (emphasizing the role that the African-American
civil rights movement has in terms of exposing the relationship between minorities generally
and law enforcement). "If the Court’s espousal of equality before the law was to be credible,
it required not only that the poor Negro be permitted to vote and to attend a school with
whites, but also that he and other disadvantaged individuals be able to exercise, as well as
possess, the same rights as the affluent white when suspected of crime." Id.
262. See id. at 63 (commenting that the Revolution’s application of federal standards
against the states necessarily drew on Supreme Court decisions that long predated the
Warren Court).
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citizens of their liberty and their humanity, it was at least going to
effectuate that deprivation fairly."263
ii. Legacy of the Revolution
In the decades following the Revolution, which effectively ended in
1969,264 the fundamental progress made by the Warren Court remained
Though subsequent Courts declined to expand on the
intact.265
developments and even chipped away at some of them,266 the criminal
justice system now clearly displayed the design of the Revolution’s central
precepts. Critics denounced the Warren Court for stepping beyond the
bounds of the court’s role,267 yet the core intent of the Revolution was to
secure "compliance with the fundamental ideals of equality and fairness
guaranteed by the United States Constitution."268 Indeed, the broader aim
of many of the Warren Court’s judgments was simply to uphold the
Constitution.269 Apart from the debate over the Court’s methodology,

263.
264.

WHITE, supra note 254, at 265.
See ANTHONY E. SCUDELLARI ET AL., Introduction to THE CRIMINAL LAW
REVOLUTION AND ITS AFTERMATH, at v (Bureau of National Affairs, 1975) (suggesting that
June 23, 1969 was "the last day of the ‘Warren Court’ era" because on that date the Court
delivered its final case in which it applied a Bill of Rights provision against the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment). The case was Benton v. Maryland, which incorporated
the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S.
784, 787 (1969) (holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment applies
to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment).
265. See Hoffman & King, supra note 256, at 802 (listing the numerous criminal
procedures which "we all take for granted today," including protections against unreasonable
searches and seizures, the right to appointed counsel, and the right to confront witnesses
among others).
266. See Kamisar, supra note 238, at 112 ("Since the Warren Court’s revolution in
criminal procedure came to an end, most of the famous cases that marked the revolution
have been . . . read narrowly, applied grudgingly, and riddled with exceptions by the Burger
and Rehnquist Courts.").
267. See, e.g., POWE, supra note 221, at 395 (describing the reaction to the Miranda
decision as including surprise at the legislative nature of the opinion and its lack of firm
constitutional underpinnings).
268. Hoffman & King, supra note 256, at 801.
269. See Harry N. Scheiber, The Warren Court, American Law, and Modern Legal
Cultures, in EARL WARREN AND THE WARREN COURT: THE LEGACY IN AMERICAN AND
FOREIGN LAW 1, 2 (Harry N. Scheiber ed., 2007) (positing that the Warren Court merely
"brought to the forefront" the constitutional standards which had long been ignored by
states).
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however, "subsequent Courts have and will continue to function in the
shadow of the Warren Court legacy."270
iii. Similarities Between Immigration Law and the Criminal Procedure
Revolution
The circumstances faced by the Revolution in the 1960s bear a strong
resemblance to the conditions which have frustrated recent efforts at
immigration reform. First, both contend with an established system of law
whose functions are central to the nation’s affairs. The Revolution altered
the procedures of criminal adjudications, which go to a core responsibility
of government, the criminal justice system.271 Immigration reform must
deal with the admittance and administration of migrants into the nation, an
issue of significant proportions for the immigrant-rich United States.
Second, both the Revolution and immigration reform attempt to ameliorate
harsh enforcement practices by government actors. The unrestrained
conduct of state and local police agents served as the primary inspiration for
the Revolution,272 yet had long been protected from federal parameters due
to federalism.273 Immigration reform will likely seek to restrain the highprofile enforcement methods employed by federal agencies, such as
workplace raids, as well as the less visible but equally severe practices,
such as long-term detention. Third, there are strong racial undertones
within both systems of law. The criminal justice system notoriously treated
defendants differently based on their race, and this discrepancy was a
motivating force behind the Revolution.274 The explicit racism that molded
the worldwide immigration quota system was legislatively removed in
1965, but immigration reform will have to confront the implicit racism that

270. UROFSKY, supra note 220, at 254.
271. See id. (suggesting that part of the lasting effect of the Warren Court was its
willingness to confront "big themes that are of great importance to modern society").
272. See Kamisar, supra note 238, at 91–92 (arguing that Chief Justice Warren’s years
in the criminal enforcement field instilled a drive to uphold rigorous policing methods
devoid of "any trickiness or any unfairness").
273. See BELKNAP, supra note 231, at 218–19 (explaining the initial hesitance of the
Supreme Court during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to become overly
involved in the states’ systems of criminal law).
274. See Pye, supra note 223, at 65 (linking the Warren Court’s criminal procedure
rulings with the African-American civil rights movement). See also Lain, supra note 222, at
1451–52 (suggesting that the Warren Court’s progressive stance on criminal procedure
reflected the growing support of racial equality in the country as a whole).
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continues to seep into immigration law and policy.275 Fourth, the political
environment for both was and is intense and highly partisan. The Warren
Court had already caused massive controversy around the country with
rulings in other areas of law, and only fanned the flames with its criminal
procedure opinions.276 Similarly, immigration reform tackles an issue that
is historically divisive as well as presently gridlocked because of the
entrenched positions of the many political factions involved. Finally, both
involve federal decisions which strongly and disproportionately affect the
states. The Revolution encountered a bewildering array of state law and
attempted to elevate those lacking the minimal procedural protections to
proper levels.277 Immigration reform will possibly redraft immigration
standards and procedures, which would consequently affect immigration
movement and populations within the states, especially in those states with
the highest immigrant populations.
Criminal procedure and immigration law underwent dramatic
transformations during the middle of the twentieth century which contrasted
with their mutually pervasive and persistent problems with class and racial
discrimination.278 The large-scale social upheaval of the 1960s reverberated
far past the predominant movements of black civil rights and anti-war
beliefs.279 It promulgated novel legal standards that are clearly seen in the
Revolution and in the 1961 and 1965 Amendments.280 Nevertheless, while
many of the basic principles put forward within the Revolution have
275. See JOHNSON, MYTH, supra note 11, at 1–54 (charting the evolution of
immigration policy as a direct reflection of race, and noting that "people of color from
developing nations are the most likely group to be excluded from the United States").
276. See David A. Strauss, The Common Law Genius of the Warren Court, 49 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 845, 868–75 (2007) (placing the Revolution’s seminal cases within the larger
controversy surrounding the Warren Court, partly from the school desegregation cases,
which mainly focused on the Court acting without constitutional support).
277. See Lain, supra note 222, at 1371–72 (observing that the state criminal justice
systems prior to the Revolution varied widely since there were only minimal benchmarks
required by the Supreme Court prior to the Warren Court).
278. See JOHNSON, MYTH, supra note 11, at 2 (noting the issues of race present in
immigration law); Pye, supra note 223, at 65 (observing the entwinement of criminal
procedures and race).
279. See WRIGHT, supra note 22, at 420 (noting the effect of the Civil Rights movement
on other social movements).
280. See Pye, supra note 223, at 65 ("Concern with civil rights almost inevitably
required attention to the rights of defendants in criminal cases."); BRIGGS, supra note 35, at
106 ("For to invoke in legislation the explicit principle that overt racism could not be
tolerated in the treatment of citizens implicitly meant that there could not be overt
discrimination in the nation’s laws governing the way future citizens would be considered
for admission as immigrants.").
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matured into bedrock legal principles over time, immigration law did not
gain such stability.281 Thus, while the Revolution and current immigration
reform share many characteristics, the most salient disparity is the
contrasting evolvement after their mutual renovations in the 1960s. If
immigration reform can import the relevant features of the Revolution,
however, it may also be able to attain comparable constancy.
C. Applying the Criminal Procedure Revolution to Immigration Reform
The durability of the Warren Court’s criminal procedure rulings rests
with three achievements of the Revolution: the institution of standard
enforcement practices,282 an increased public faith in the criminal justice
system,283 and the realization of Constitutional promises.284 These
accomplishments, much like the Revolution’s motivations, are directly
linked to the more visible public priorities of the 1960s.285 First, the
federalization of criminal procedure provided national standards which
applied equally throughout the states.286 This regularity was chiefly aimed
at the South, "where racial prejudice fueled already hostile sentiment
toward those accused of criminal wrongdoing."287 Beyond this, the
guidelines also aspired to refine police methods and encourage better
281. See supra Part I.E (discussing the major legislative changes which have occurred
during the last half century).
282. See WHITE, supra note 254, at 272 (portraying the Supreme Court’s rationale for
the Revolution as partly to produce strong standards for police to guarantee "more
enlightened law enforcement"); Lain, supra note 221, at 1369–72 (describing the shift of
power from the state governments to the federal government in controlling criminal
adjudications throughout the nation).
283. See UROFSKY, supra note 220, at 254 (noting the Warren Court’s long-standing
and influential criminal procedure decisions).
284. See id. at 157 (crediting the Revolution with aligning the rights embodied in the
Constitution with proper law enforcement practices).
285. See supra Part I.D (presenting briefly the larger social and political movements of
the era).
286. See supra note 282 (explaining the success of the Revolution in instituting
standard enforcement practices).
287. See Lain, supra note 222, at 1371–72 (illustrating the particularly hostile attitudes
towards minority criminal defendants in the southern states). "[D]efendants were routinely
treated like pieces of meat to be processed and then forwarded for proper packaging. Police
plucked individuals off the streets for little or no reason, searched them without a warrant,
questioned them using strong-arm tactics, and then (if sufficiently satisfied with the evidence
of guilt) sent them on to the formal adjudication process for trial or, more likely, a guilty
plea." Id.
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practices nation-wide.288 Second, in the face of increasing criminal
prosecutions, the Court recognized a growing dissatisfaction with the
criminal justice system.289 "[T]he Supreme Court . . . recognized that the
nation was in the midst of a social revolution before this became apparent
to most of the elected representatives of the people and . . . sought to
eliminate the basic defects in our [criminal justice] system."290 Though the
Revolution has inspired mixed reactions since its deployment, considerable
scholarship exists crediting it with constructive improvements to criminal
justice.291 Third, the Revolution delivered on Constitutional protections
which had long been denied to citizens.292 Despite the legal rationality of
federalism and the traditional deference to state control over criminal law,
"the implementation of constitutional rights which [had] existed only in
theory in the past" resonated with the public.293 The initial influence and
lasting appeal of the Court, and the Revolution in particular, derive
principally from this unabashed loyalty to the "principles of fairness and
equality that were part of the ethical structure of the Constitution."294 More
importantly, the guiding philosophy remains viable today as a valid
understanding of the Constitution’s checks on the state’s enforcement
powers.295
288. See POWE, supra note 221, at 492 (remarking that the Revolution was to ensure
proper police methods not only in "backwater" regions but in every state of the country).
"[The] goal was to force state systems to behave like [the Warren Court] assumed the FBI,
United States attorneys, and the federal courts behaved." Id.
289. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 229, at 271 (describing the Court’s sense that
aggressive rulings were in order to effectuate needed changes in the states’ criminal justice
systems due to a lack of momentum by any other capable body); Pye, supra note 223, at 66
(contrasting the Court’s traditionally gradual sensibilities with the impetus it sensed towards
making radical changes to criminal procedure norms).
290. Pye, supra note 223, at 66.
291. See UROFSKY, supra note 220, at 254 (crediting the Warren Court’s ability to
select the "right" answers generally, and within its criminal procedure cases, for its longstanding influence); Hoffman & King, supra note 256, at 802 (suggesting that current
criminal defendants are indebted to the Revolution for many of the protections they enjoy).
292. See WHITE, supra note 254, at 275 (describing the Revolution as ultimately
"making law enforcement practice more closely approximate ideals of justice and fairness");
UROFSKY, supra note 220, at 157 (viewing the Revolution as essentially transforming the
Constitution into a "living document" which more closely resembled the aspirations of the
Framers for the modern age).
293. Pye, supra note 223, at 67.
294. WHITE, supra note 254, at 265 (emphasis added). The Warren Court considered
the criminal justice system from the point of view of the defendant as well as the prosecutor,
and attempted to craft decisions that balanced between their naturally conflicting interests.
Id. at 265–66.
295. See Hoffman & King, supra note 256, at 802 (describing the changes enforced by
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In comparing criminal procedure reform and potential immigration
reform, the two most striking difficulties are the questions of capacity and
citizenship, which will be explained in turn. First, in order to effectuate
reform within any area of law, there must be a measure of legal capacity to
make the reform binding. Despite the criticisms of judicial abandon, the
Supreme Court in carrying out the Revolution possessed legal authority
through its historical responsibility to interpret and apply the
Constitution.296 Additionally, this function was effectively shielded from
popular judgment due to the Court’s unique position in the federal
government.297 On the other hand, immigration reform must take place
within the volatile political processes of Congress, as it is the only political
body empowered to realize such reform. The current legislative paralysis
concerning immigration is testament to the structural and political obstacles
which must be managed if immigration reform is to occur. Simply put, the
five votes required to perpetuate the Revolution are dwarfed by the
hundreds of votes necessary to enact federal immigration legislation, not to
mention the political accountability felt by each congressional member.
Second and more troublesome, enforceable legal rights require citizenship.
The Revolution operated on the implication that constitutional rights owed
to criminal defendants were being denied to them.298 In contrast,
noncitizens enjoy relatively few rights and therefore often lack meaningful
protection from essentially unconstitutional government action.299
Fortunately, the traits of the Revolution described above function as
solutions to these difficulties and provide guidance for gaining long-term
stability in immigration law. As a starting point, immigration reform
should restore the importance of the courts, which were so central to the
Revolution.300 This can be achieved in part by restoring full habeas corpus
the Revolution as "necessary" and vitally important to contemporary criminal adjudications).
296. See BELKNAP, supra note 231, at 218–19 (outlining the Supreme Court’s authority
in dictating minimal standards of criminal procedural protections as it developed from the
passage of the Fourteenth Amendment).
297. See id. (same).
298. See Pye, supra note 223, at 67 (arguing that the Revolution fulfilled the true intent
of the Bill of Rights, in that it provided criminal defendants with adequate mechanisms by
which they may defend themselves from the many powers of the state).
299. See, e.g., Cruz, supra note 154, at 485–86 (discussing the unclear due process
rights of noncitizen respondents in deportation hearings).
300. Id. at 66–67 (recognizing the Supreme Court’s initiative in implementing the
Revolution "[d]espite persuasive arguments urging different action [including] the principles
of federalism [which through the Revolution] have yielded to the desire of the Court to
provide equal justice to the rich and the poor in state and federal criminal proceedings"). See
also Stacy Caplow, Renorming Immigration Court, 13 NEXUS 85, 101 (2007-2008)
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review as discussed above and allowing the numerous federal district courts
to become involved in immigration adjudications.301 Allowing this
oversight of executive enforcement would encourage the federal
immigration agencies to comply with proper procedures, and the courts
would correct that behavior which does not conform to minimal
standards.302 Beyond applying the statutory and regulatory law, the courts
would also protect fundamental rights where necessary.303 Though not
every immigrant must receive full constitutional protections, there are
minimal rights that must be protected, such as the right to petition a court
for habeas corpus.304 This regularization and semi-constitutionalization of
immigration enforcement should also provide greater public faith in the
federal immigration enforcement agencies, as it would hopefully minimize
the more extreme enforcement practices as well as establish better
reputations for the police and other government actors in the immigrant
communities.305 This public goodwill would then ultimately serve to justify
(presenting various recommendations for Immigration Courts to ameliorate a judicial system
that is vitally important for "people who are very worthy, who have truly suffered and been
abandoned by their countries, or who have the right to stay in this country though time,
stakes, contributions, and character").
301. See Benson, Paper Dolls, supra note 30, at 63–64 ("Better review, at the
administrative level and in the federal courts, enhances the quality of our legal system and
aids the agency officials administering the law."). Moreover, due to the burden of
immigration appeals on the federal courts of appeals, "cases perhaps should be shifted back
to the federal district courts in order to spread the workload among a larger number of
judges." Id.
302. See id. ("The dialogue generated in the review process is one of our legal system’s
methods of identifying problems in the law.").
303. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001) ("At its historical core, the writ of
habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it
is in that context that its protections have been strongest."). Though limited historically to
legal matters, "an attack on an executive order could raise all issues relating to the legality of
the detention." Id. at 301 n.14 (quoting Developments in the Law—Federal Habeas Corpus,
83 HARV. L. REV. 1038, 1238 (1970)).
304. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 305 ("[T]o conclude that the writ is no longer available in
this context would represent a departure from historical practice in immigration law. The
writ of habeas corpus has always been available to review the legality of Executive
detention."). See also Norako, supra note 124, at 1617–20 (describing the foundations of the
writ of habeas corpus in U.S. law and its great importance to immigration law).
305. Cf. Lanza v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 917, 928 (2004) ("The concern behind an alien’s
right to petition this Court for relief is a familiar one—that personal freedom can only be
preserved when there are institutional checks on arbitrary government action."). See also
Evans, supra note 145, at 603–10 (arguing that because immigration raids conducted within
the U.S. are not only constitutionally questionable but also detrimental to the communities
they strike, a change in policy is needed to monitor such enforcement practices with greater
scrutiny).
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the difficult political maneuverings that reestablished the courts’ role in
immigration.
V. Conclusion
Comprehensive immigration reform, if done with an eye towards the
justifications stated for the creation of our modern immigration system,
would not be a blind leap into radically new territory. Rather, this type of
historical underpinning would give reform a sturdy foundation which both
the population and the government can recognize. It would merely be "an
affirmation of old principles."306 Due consideration must be given to
current realities and there must be efforts to provide logical and forwardlooking solutions, yet any reform must also signify a commitment to past
intentions.307 This includes those beliefs woven into the language of the
Constitution, and in addressing immigration reform with reference to its
underlying principles, the public memory is refreshed of these ideals.308
Mindful of the commitments made to provide a more equitable immigration
system, Congress should decide that habeas corpus is a hallmark of all U.S.
courts, including immigration courts.309 "We cannot boast of our
magnificent system of law, and enact immigration legislation which
violates decent principles of legal protection."310 This return to a firm role
of judicial review in immigration would provide greatly needed stability,
benefitting both future immigrants and the United States.

306. KENNEDY, supra note 82, at 82.
307. See WHOM SHALL WE WELCOME, supra note 42, at xii–xv (presenting underlying
beliefs of the Commission reflecting the beliefs of the United States on immigration and
international relations before advocating for a change in the immigration legal structure to
accurately exhibit those beliefs).
308. See Fiss, supra note 213, at 17 ("[T]he Constitution is not a set of rules to
maximize individual welfare on some global scale [but] a statement about how a society
wishes to organize itself.").
309. See Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. 85, 101 (1868) (finding that the "great and leading
intent of the Constitution . . . in respect to the writ of habeas corpus . . . is that every citizen
may be protected by judicial action from unlawful imprisonment"). Regarding the
availability of the writ and suggesting the universality of habeas corpus to all those detained
by the government the Court stated: "It is unimportant in what custody the prisoner may be,
if it is a custody to which he has been remanded by the order of an inferior court of the
United States."
310. WHOM SHALL WE WELCOME, supra note 42, at xv.

